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Global Trends in Securities Regulation:
The Changing Legal Climate
Dr. Barry A.K. Rider*
I. Introduction
This article boasts the title "Global Regulatory Trends" and then in
parenthesis "The Changing Legal Climate." It is of course, bold if not
foolish, to try and distill "global" trends when in most countries, even
the national approach to securities regulation is ambiguous and often
inconsistent. Governments like to speak in terms of deregulation today.'
What this means in the context of the financial markets is not always
clear. Of course, over the last decade capital has become significantly
more mobile both domestically and internationally. Freedom of
establishment in foreign markets has also increased and today, in many
cases international markets are contemplated not only in terms of the
paper in which the trading occurs, but also with regard to the players and
intermediaries.
In the same manner, today's international community is far more
aware of the dangers to the economic and political stability of matters
such as economic crime and money laundering. Such awareness, in
large part, may be attributed to the efforts of the United States.2 The
United States has advanced the fight against drug barons and insider
dealers almost to the level of a crusade or jihad. Its agencies, such as
the Securities and Exchange Commission, have pursued those who have
apparently impugned the integrity of U.S. capitalism to the ends of the
earth. Further, the United States has "encouraged" the world to legislate
against the dreaded crime of insider dealing, which after all, has been
and still is, almost endemic in many developing and not so new markets,
particularly in Asia and the Far East. The United States has cajoled and
* Dean, Tutor, Director of Studies and Fellow of Jesus College, University of Cambridge;
Lecturer in Financial Law, University of Cambridge; President of The British Institute of Securities
Laws and Executive Director of The Centre for International Documentation on Organised and
Economic Crime. This article is based upon a paper presented at an international conference on
securities regulation, which took place in 1994 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and at the Cambridge
International Symposium on Economic Crime. The views expressed are those of the author and
should not be regarded as necessarily reflecting the opinion of those agencies with whom he has and
is still connected.
1. See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT 1994,
MARKET 2000 (1994).
2. U.S. Senator Kerry has recently stated that the fight against economic crime in the United
States should be considered as issue in national defense. See generally Barry Rider, Organised
Economic Crime, Report to Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, U.K. Parliament (1994).
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coerced countries as powerful as Japan, Germany, and Switzerland to
enact laws against insider dealing. These laws can then provide a basis
for mutual assistance for U.S. authorities when they seek to pursue their
own insiders overseas. The same has occurred in regard to money
laundering, not just in relation to the proceeds of drug trafficking, but in
regard to the proceeds of other forms of serious crime.
The United States, rightly or wrongly, has required the world to
declare war on the money launderer. The result of these initiatives has,
to the mind of a simple lawyer, been to create a good deal more
regulation and control. Such has indeed been the case in Britain and
Malaysia. Now, in Britain, for the first time since the abolition of the
feudal offense of misprision of felony, persons who in the course of his
work or profession learns facts that leads them to suspect that someone
else, perhaps a client or colleague, is laundering the proceeds of a
criminal offense involving drugs, and fails to report their suspicions,
commit a serious offense.' Is this really a manifestation of deregulation?
By the same token, Britain's new law on insider dealing is so
encompassing, it imposes regulation on a number of activities that were
previously undertaken with impunity.4 As such, while the British
Government proclaims deregulation, it nevertheless now has over twenty
regulatory authorities with responsibility for overseeing the financial
services industry. In Malaysia, the debate on deregulation seems to
favor more laws and more "policemen."
Another, so called "global trend" is the pursuit of greater
transparency. It is said that "sun light is the best disinfectant and electric
light the best policeman." In other words, more disclosure will
inevitably discourage wrongdoing and abuse. In the context of the
financial markets, however, this is not a proven thesis. Much depends
upon the matter being disclosed and to whom the matter is disclosed. A
great deal also depends upon the willingness of the press to pursue and
to expose. Furthermore, it has to be seriously doubted whether most
investors are really concerned about the morality of corporate
management. Are they not more concerned with obtaining a good return
on their investments? It is, of course, the case that the more disclosure
of reliable and relevant information, the more sensible and, thus,
economic, will be the investment decisions of investors. However, as
the main medium of corporate disclosure is the financial statement, it
must be asked how effective this form of disclosure actually is. For
3. Criminal Justice Act, 1993, s. 19 (Eng.).
4. See generally BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, INSIDER CRIME (1993).
GLOBAL TRENDS IN SECURITIES REGULATION
example, how many investors in Malaysia significantly rely on published
financial information when making investment decisions?
Perhaps a more important trend in securities regulation is for
regulation to become increasingly proactive. Traditional policing, is
quite properly, essentially reactive. On the other hand, banking
regulators have long recognized that once there has been a run on a
bank, it is usually too late to do much. Therefore, to be effective in
insuring the integrity of the banking system, banking regulation most be
proactive. Securities regulators have also acknowledged-often with the
urging of those in central banking systems-that becoming proactive
ensures that those permitted to handle other peoples' money are fit and
proper persons and remain so.
This article focuses on the role of securities regulators in ensuring
the integrity of the capital market, using Britain and Malaysia as case
studies. While it is appreciated that the North American reader may well
consider the choice of these jurisdiction as arbitrary, the English
securities market has had a long history of regulation, although only
relatively recently through legal mechanisms. Reliance has been and still
is placed, on the efficacy of self-regulation to an extent probably greater
than anywhere else. The selection of Malaysia is justified on the basis
that it is a relatively new market, although with an impressive turnover
and capitalization. In so far as the regulators and legislators in Malaysia
have looked to the experience of other jurisdictions, most noticeably
Australia and the United States, it provides an interesting counterpoint
to what has taken place in recent years in Britain.
It is a simple, but true observation, that investors both at home and
abroad cannot be expected to have confidence in a market that is
manifestly corrupt and tainted. Those who do not care and are prepared
to enter such a market irrespective of its character are exactly the kind
of investor who no country needs. They are the crooks and con-men or
those who would subvert the values that we all have.
II. Policing the Markets
When questioned as to how far his Writ ran, King Henry II
responded as far as his arrows reached! Given the developments that
have since taken place in ballistics, such an approach to jurisdiction
might accommodate the extraterritorial zeal of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.5 Unfortunately, however, Henry II's response
5. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972). See generally D. Chaikin, Fraud, Securities Laws and Extraterritoriality in the U.S. in THE
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characterizes a more restrained, and even parochial, attitude toward
jurisdiction in England. In England and those jurisdictions that follow
English common law, such as Malaysia, the criminal law6 confines itself
within the straight-jacket of the territorial principle.7 In other words,
the Queen's writ in criminal matters8 generally runs to the edge of the
territorial waters and no further. In a world where transactions can
occur on an almost instantaneous basis in or through a number of
sovereign jurisdictions, the limits of the criminal justice system become
immediately apparent.9
III. The International Dimension
It is not only for such anti-social reasons that so much in the world
of finance and commerce today stretches beyond national frontiers."
Development in communications, technology, and the general mobility
of capital and persons have all irresistibly contributed to a highly
interdependent world economy, with truly international markets." For
a host of sound commercial reasons, a significant proportion of any
nation's business transaction will involve a multiplicity of jurisdictions.
REGULATION OF THE BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Barry Rider ed., 1979); A. NEALE AND M.
STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION (1988). Perhaps one of the
most drastic illustrations of the so-called unilateral approach is the U.S. Security and Exchange
Commission's proposal for 'waiver by conduct' jurisdiction, see SEC. Ex. ACT REL. No 21186
(1984), discussed in W. Hasetine, International Regulation of Securities Markets, 36 I.C.L.O. 307
(1987).
6. For example, a murder or manslaughter committed by a British citizen outside the United
Kingdom may be tried in England as though it had been committed there. See Offences Against the
Persons Act. 1961, s. 9 (Eng.). Under the same Act, bigamy committed outsidethe United Kingdom
is an offense within English jurisdiction. Id. s. 57. For an example of extraterritoriality under
Malaysian law, see Penal Code, s.4 (Malay.) (regarding offenses against the state).
7. LAW COMMISSION, THE TERRITORIAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENT OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw (1979) (Eng.). With regard to economic crimes, see L.H. Leigh, Territorial Jurisdiction and
Fraud, [1988] Crim. L.R. 280 (Eng.); J. Breslin, Extraterritorial Control of Securities Frauds (1989)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge) (on file with author).
8. In fact, the main basis for the common law is territoriality, whether liability be civil or
criminal. See DPP v. Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 (Keith, L., opinion) (Eng.).
9. See generally BARRY RIDER, THE PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CO-
OPERATION TO COMBAT COMMERCIAL AND-ECONOMIC CRIME, (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980).
Today, it is only the most casual or incompetent economic criminal who would venture to confine
his illicit activities to within a single jurisdiction. Y.B. Dato-Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar,
Minister of Law of Malaysia, Opening Address at Third Regional Symposium on Economic Crime
in Kuala Lumpur (Mar. 28, 1994). By involving others in the contemplation or execution of the
offense, economic criminals dramatically reduce the chances of detection and effective investigation,
let alone the even more remote possibility of having to atone for their actions before court. Id.
10. See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION REPORT,
INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS (1987).
11. D. AYLING, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF STOCK MARKETS (1986).
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This is perhaps no more so apparent as in the corporate securities
industry.' The international "character" of securities markets is
nothing new. Some of the earliest English joint stock companies were
concerned with foreign trade. For example, in February, 1553,
Sebastian Cabot formed a company with 240 shareholders to trade with
Russia. A year earlier a company had been chartered with the rather
more romantic object of "discovery of regions, dominions, islands and
places unknown." Indeed, some of the earliest recorded trading in script
and bonds within the City of London was in regard to such
companies.' 3 In fact, some of the most ancient "markets" appear to
have been primarily concerned with "foreign goods."' The securities
markets of today often constitute markets for paper issued by foreign
issuers and may be operated by members who have direct or indirect
foreign interests, trading for or on behalf of persons outside jurisdiction.
While the degree of internationalization obviously varies from one
market to another, virtually every market is subject, to some extent, to
the essentially international imperative of money.' 5 Surprisingly, little
attention has been given to the implications of internationalization of the
securities markets on what are essentially domestic structures of
securities regulation.' 6 While economists and even politicians have long
recognized the significance of internationalization, few lawyers have, and
those that have, have perceived relevant issues solely in terms of national
jurisdiction. 7 This somewhat parochial approach is not confined to
12. P. STONHM, GLOBAL STOCK MARKET REFORMS (1987).
13. See A. JENKINS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE STORY (1973); H. BERMAN, THE STOCK
EXCHANGE (1962); E. MORGAN & W. THOMAS, THE STOCK EXCHANGE (1962).
14. See R. HODGES, PRIMITIVE AND PEASANT MARKETS (1988); M. SILVER, ECONOMIC
STRUCTURES OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST (1985).
15. See generally THE MARKET FOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES (OECD Committee on Financial
Markets, 1972); B. BROWN, THE FLIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL - A CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY (1987); THE STOCK EXCHANGE - AIMS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE EXCHANGE IN THE
MODERN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS (G. Pivato ed., 1972). Even the most undeveloped
markets are unable to ignore the impact of internationalism. See K. DOODHA, STOCK EXCHANGES
IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY (University of Bombay, 1962); BARRY RIDER AND S. FUNG, REGU-
LATING THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET (1989).
16. See generally S. Hebenton & B. Gibson, International Aspects of Securities Legislation in
3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA, (Government of Canada, 1979);
BARRY RIDER, FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BARBADOS ON THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
OF BARBADOS AND A REGIONAL CAPITAL MARKET (1979).
17. See Barry Rider, Combatting International Commercial Crime, 2 LLOYDS MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 217 (1985); D. Chaikin, Combatting International Fraud (1983) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on file with author). Indeed, even Professor L.C.B. Gower,
in his review of investor protection in Britain, barely mentioned the impact of internationalization,
devoting only a few paragraphs to the "off shore problem" in his initial Discussion Document and
Final Report. See. e.g. L.C.B. GOWER, DEP'T OF TRADE, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION-A
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Britain. In fact, other than North America, where jurisdictional disputes
are endemic, very few jurisdictions have given any real consideration to
the problem. It is almost entirely futile to search for learned writings on
the impact of transnational transactions in securities on traditional models
of regulation in the Commonwealth or Europe. Of course, to some
extent this reflects the undeveloped stage of learning and research in
corporate securities regulation in these jurisdictions.
IV. Securities Regulation
A. The Historical Approach
Traditionally, the approach of the common law to the control and
regulation of foreign transactions has been to simply assert domestic
jurisdiction through whatever normative system was applicable. Thus,
in England, a foreign issuer desirous of seeing its securities quoted on
The Stock Exchange was required to comply with English law as
scrupulously as was possible. This naturally varied in practice
considerably, given the general requirements available for domestic
issuers. Indeed, in some instances, because specific statutory exemptions
might not be available for a foreign company, the more demanding "self-
regulatory" requirements of the market would be applied. Until recently,
members of the various organized markets18 were required to be
domestic and the strict requirements of exchange control regulation 9
effectively separated the domestic and international financial worlds.2
In large measure, this is also the experience of Malaysia.
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (1982) (Eng.); L.C.B. GOWER, DEP'T OF TRADE, REVIEW OF INVESTOR
PROTECTION-FINAL REPORT, CMND. 9125 1.19 (1985) (Eng.) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
o 18. In Britain, the securities industry has been more or less confined within the "square mile"
of The City of London. See generally W. CLARKE, INSIDE THE CITY (1979); A. HILTON, CITY
WITHIN A STATE (1987); H. MCRAE AND F. CAIRNCROSS, CAPITAL CITY (1985); Barry Rider &
E. Hew, The Regulation of Corporation and Securities Law in Britain - The Beginning of The Real
Debate 19 MALAY. L. REV. 144 (1977) (Malay.). The over-the-counter market did not really exist
on an organized basis.
19. See J. PLENDER & P. WALLACE, THE SQUARE MILE (1985); T.M. Ashe, Securities
Transactions and Exchange Control in THE REGULATION OF THE BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY
(Barry Rider ed., 1979).
20. See BARRY RIDER ET AL., CCH GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT (2d ed. 1986)
(Eng.) [hereinafter CCH GUIDE].
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B. The Current Approach
1. Britain
(a) Criminal Law. -In Britain, the criminal law was and still
is, equally simplistic and parochial. In the context of the securities
markets, the most relevant area of the criminal law is that of fraud and
cheating." A special working party of The English Law Commission
has recently described the primary feature of the present common law
rules on jurisdiction in fraud matter as that of "insularity."' These
rules generally provide that a triable crime will be committed where and
only where its last element takes place within territorial jurisdiction.23
The common law distinguishes between so called result-crimes and
conduct-crimes. In the case of the first category, there will be
jurisdiction if the proscribed result occurred within territorial jurisdiction.
In the case of conduct-crimes, it does not generally matter that the
consequences occurred beyond the shores, if the proscribed result
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction. This seemingly clear
application results in ludicrous decisions. The development of electronic
and other modern methods of transferring money and dealing in
securities across national boundaries has naturally produced further
problems. The implications of the restrictive attitude of the English
courts were manifest in R. v. Tomsett,' where a telex operator
employed by a Swiss bank in London wrongfully diverted a large sum
of money in an account in New York to another account in Geneva.
English common law rules exclude from jurisdiction conspiracies to
commit frauds outside the country. Consequently, when the operator
successfully argued that the theft did not take place in England, he was
successful in avoiding the jurisdiction of the English courts.
21. Barry Rider, Policing the International Financial Markets, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 199
(1990). See generally M. CLARKE, REGULATING THE CITY (1986); L. LEIGH, THE CONTROL OF
COMMERCIAL FRAUD (1982); L. Leigh, Securities Regulation: Problems in Relation to Sanctions,
in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA (Government of Canada, 1979); M.
LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD (1987).
22. JURISDICTION OVER FRAUD OFFENCES WITH A FOREIGN ELEMENT - A CONSULTATION
PAPER (he Criminal Law Team of The Law Commission, 1987) [hereinafter JURISDICTION OVER
FRAUD OFFENCES].
23. See generally A. ARLIDGE & J. PARRY, FRAUD (1985). Of course, the Malaysian law in
relation to fraud and cheating offences is not necessarily so restricted. See generally P.R.
Glazabrook, Fraud Offences in Singapore and Malaysia, Address at First Regional Symposium on
Economic Crime, Awana, Malaysia (1991).
24. 119851 CRIM. L.R. 369 (Eng.).
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The English Law Commission's working party recognized that the
approach of the English courts "may well be perceived by other
countries as an insular, indeed, chauvinistic indifference to their
interests, a perception that may be damaging to the interests of the
United Kingdom. "25 Thus, the Law Commission's working party made
sensible recommendations in regard to jurisdiction. Specifically, it
recommended that if any "act or omission forming part of the offence,
or any event necessary to the completion of any offence" occurs within
England, English courts have jurisdiction to hear such matters. 2' The
Commission excluded from its proposals offenses relating to investments,
as such offenses often involve other considerations. The Law
Commission's proposals have now been enacted in the Criminal Justice
Act of 199327 in regard to the more general offenses in English law,
and those crimes relating specifically to the financial investments are now
governed by their own special rules relating to jurisdiction.
(b) The Financial Services Act of 1986.-In regard to British
securities regulation, the Securities and Exchange Commission's Division
of Corporate Finance, in its report on internationalization to the U.S.
Congress in July 1987, observed that "the extent of extra-territorial
jurisdiction claimed by the UK regulatory agencies has never been
subject to much discussion."' The same could be said for most
countries, especially Malaysia. However, Britain's Financial Services
Act of 198629. created an entirely new regime of regulation and super-
vision of the securities industry in Britain. Prior to the Financial
Services Act, the structure of control was essentially self-regulatory.
Within this system of self-control there were many forms of regulation
and numerous bodies, including some that exercised formal and on
occasions even an official regulatory mandate, and others that functioned
as little more than clubs.' ° While this worked well when the City of
25. JURISDICTION OVER FRAUD OFFENCES, supra note 22, at 24, 1.4.
26. This would be essentially the same as § 1.03(l)(a) of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a).
27. See generally Criminal Justice Act, 1993, s. 62 (Eng.) (concerning insider dealing);
Financial Service Act, 1986, s. 47 (Eng.) (concerning market frauds). In relation to the position in
Malaysia, see Securities Industry Act, 1983, ss. 84-91 (Malay.) (regarding market frauds).
28. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO U.S. CONGRESS ON
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES REGULATION (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Division of Corporate Finance, 1987).
29. Financial Services Act, 1986 (Eng.).
30. See generally E. Hew, The Anatomy of Regulation in the Securities Industry in THE
REGULATION ON THE BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY (Barry Rider ed., 1979); Barry Rider & E.
Hew, The Regulation of Corporation and Securities Laws in Britain - the Beginning of the Real
Debate, 19 MALAY. L. REV. 144 (1977) (Malay.) [hereinafter The Regulation of Corporation and
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London was essentially a close knit, homogeneous "village," with the
post-World War II changes in London inhabitants and business
dealings-in particular with the suspension of exchange control regulation
in 1979-the traditional forms of restraint provided no protection against
the "incompetent, let alone the fraudulent"."
The various authorities that sought to "police" the City before 1986
were able to exercise their powers without strict regard to the normal
constraints of legal jurisdiction. For example, the City Panel on Take-
over and Mergers was prepared to "apply" the strict letter of the Take-
over Code to Malaysian companies and individuals who attempted to take
control over a British public company. Indeed, one of the alleged
advantages of self-regulation was its ability to operate beyond the stricter
constraints of jurisdiction that apply to legal rules.
In contrast, a senior civil servant in the Department of Trade and
Industry has observed that "the fundamental purpose of the Financial
Services Act is to create a safe environment in which those who consume
investment services within the United Kingdom can do so with
confidence."32 Thus, the philosophy of the Act, in so far as there is a
cogent one,33 is simply to control the financial services industry within
the traditional territorial jurisdiction. Where the relevant activity occurs
outside the United Kingdom, the controls "go no further than is
justifiable in accordance with established rules of international law and
the principles of international good manners."' Of course, the
weakness with this rather gentlemanly approach is that crooks do not
invariably observe "good manners." There is obviously a convincing
argument in favor of responsible states not permitting their jurisdictions
to be abused by crooks as "safe havens." This is surely a principle of
"good neighbourness" let alone "good manners."" Malaysia has long
recognized this, particularly in the area of illicit drug trafficking.
Securities Laws in Britain].
31. See BLOND BRIGOS & BARRY RIDER, INSIDER TRADING (1983); CLARKE, supra note 18,
at 23; R. SPIEGELBERG, THE CITY: POWER WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY (1973); T. Haddon, Fraud
in the City: The Role of the Criminal Law, [1985] CIuM. L.R. 500 (Eng.).
32. J. Rickford, Developments in the U.K. - Securities Regulation, an International
Perspective (1986) (paper presented at a conference organized by the Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary College) (on file with author).
33. See CCH GUIDE, supra note 20.
34. Rickford, supra note 32.
35. See generally Barry Rider, Policing the City - Combatting Fraud and Other Abuses in the
Corporate Securities Industry 41 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 47 (1988) (Eng.) [hereinafter Policing the
City].
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The Financial Services Act and the regime that it creates is
essentially a "compromise package."36 It makes a determined, and
almost successful effort, to satisfy everyone's vested interests and
preconceptions. It is no less a compromise in its attempt to
accommodate the foreign aspects of securities regulation.
Of course, to some extent the hands of the Government were tied
by the Treaty of Rome,37 and in other cases, such as in regard to Japan,
economic and political considerations dictated a spirit of compromise.
Under the new regime, an investment business that is based in and
regulated by the laws and regulations of another member country of the
European Community (EC) is allowed to operate freely in Britain.
"Harmonization" of EC regulation in this area was the goal of the
bureaucrats in Brussels, and this was not only sensible in practical terms,
but wholly acceptable. However, harmonization of financial services
regulation has been offered as a workable and attainable goal and the
guiding principal today is mere "equivalence. "38 The primary structure
of regulation for financial and banking institutions within the EC is
"home state" authorization with mutual recognition of each other's
authorization procedures on the basis that they are broadly equivalent.39
In practice, this might well mean that some European countries operate
systems of regulation that are far less demanding than others. It is
certain that some systems of regulation will be far less exacting both in
terms of application and administration than those set down under the
Financial Services Act in Britain. The temptation for Britain and
overseas firms to relocate in a more "hospitable" and probably "warmer"
jurisdiction are obvious. Consequently, it may well be that in time EC
integration of financial services will, instead of enhancing the
effectiveness of regulation, result in a lowering of standards, at -least in
Britain. Malaysia should be also be aware of these dangers in the
context of regional initiatives in Asia.
While the general approach to securities regulation in Britain is
essentially what it has always been, namely that foreign investors must
obey British law, there are one Or two exceptions where British
regulations do in effect extend beyond national boundaries. High
pressure selling of securities, either through cold calling or from "bucket
36. Financial Services Act, 1986 (Eng.).
37. Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167.
38. See B. RIDER AND T.M. ASHE, EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATION (1993); M. Bax,
Financial Services in The European Economic Community after 1992, Lecture Delivered at the
University of Cambridge (1989).
39. See generally 1992 - INVESTMENT SERVICES (Linklaters & Paines, 1989).
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shops," has become an increasing problem in Europe and elsewhere in
recent years."' Indeed, Malaysia has been used by such operators as
both a base for launching attacks on investors throughout the Asia-Pacific
Region and as a target itself. The "boiler room merchants" who learned
their trade in Canada and the United States moved their operations to
Europe, and in particular Amsterdam, during the late 1970s. They then
seemingly plied their despicable trade with virtual impunity.4 ' Of
course, the practice of "share hawking" is not new in Britain or Malaysia
for that matter. The British Government set up a committee under Sir
Archibald Bodkin in 1936 to inquire into such undesirable practices, and
the recommendations of this committee42 led to the enactment of The
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1939." Indeed,
Commissioners appointed by Parliament reported in November, 1696 that
fraudulent promoters of worthless shares were selling such "with
Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the Reputation, falsely raised,
and artfully spread, concerning the thriving state of their Stock. "" It
would seem that the profession of the "loader" is not a new one in
Britain or Malaysia.
Section 56(1) of the British Financial Services Act prohibits any
person from doing any investment business during or in consequence of
an unsolicited call made on a person in the United Kingdom or from the
United Kingdom on a person elsewhere. 5 This prohibition creates a
40. See M. BOSE & C. GUNN, FRAUD (1989); R. BOSWORTH-DAVIES, FRAUD IN THE CITY
(1988); D. FRANCIS, CONTREPRENEURS (1988); D. Henry, Funny money stocks, FORBES, Sept. 23.
1985, at 38.
41. See D. FRANCIS, supra note 40, at 45. For example, Irving Kott and Thomas Quinn
established their organizations and then disseminated a plethora of worthless stocks on an
unsuspecting, but often greedy public, invariably employing inexperienced and dishonest salesmen
to even engage in cold calling and high pressure telephone selling. See id. Thomas Quinn and his
network was one subject of a special meeting organized by the General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol
on February 14, 1980. See Boiler Plate at Full Steam, 128 N.L.J. 618 (1988) (Eng.).
A number of these operations have organized crime connections and those operating in
Malaysia certainly did. See, e.g. H.L. 001, COLD CALLING AND HIGH PRESSURE SELLING OF
SECURITIES (1992); M. Rowe, FRAUD IN TRADE FINANCE 43 (1989); A. SHIPMAN & BARRY RIDER,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (International Chamber of Commerce, 1987); A. Gibson, The
Global Corporate Intelligence Function, Fourth I.M.B. Lecture at Queen Mary College (Nov. 15,
1988) (copy on file with author).
42. See generally R. PENNINGTON, THE INVESTOR AND THE LAw (1968); C.H. Welch, The
Department of Trade and Supervision of The Securities Markets, in THE REGULATION OF THE
BRITISH SECURITIES INDUSTRY (B. Rider ed., 1979).
43. The Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act of 1939 was reenacted with minor amendments
as the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act of 1958. Before the Financial Services Act 1986, this
represented the principal piece of securities regulation in Britain.
44. HOUSE OF COMMON J., Nov. 25, 1696 (Eng.).
45. See generally CCH GUIDE, supra note 20.
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"civil offense" insofar as any resulting contract will not be enforceable
against the investor approached, and thus, the investor will be able to
recover money or property transferred under the contract or
compensation. It is important to note that this provision extends to "cold
calling" by individuals in the United Kingdom on persons overseas. One
of the reasons that criminal liability was not imposed is that it was
thought unjustifiable to extend the scope of the criminal law in this way.
Where the unsolicited call is made from outside the United Kingdom, it
is questionable whether a foreign court would apply English law in
assisting an investor in recovering his money or property. Should the
call be made from an EC country it is, at least arguable, that an English
court could take jurisdiction under section 4 of the EC Brussels
Convention of 19684 on the basis that it is a "consumer contract." An
order of the English High Court would therefore be enforceable
throughout the Community under the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act of 1982.' 7
In assessing the credibility of any new regime of regulation,
however, it is necessary to measure what has so far been achieved
against its guiding philosophy and objectives. Sadly, little thought has
been given to the philosophical issues of securities regulation, and such
debate as there has been has tended to concentrate on such matter as
insider dealing. 8 While it is true that some of the earliest laws seeking
to regulate markets were based upon the importance of promoting and
maintaining public confidence in their integrity and thus, efficiency,49
concentration on this aspect tends to obscure the essentially facilitative
nature of securities regulation.' While it is also possible to discern a
number of philosophical threads in for example, the Financial Services
Act, not the least being the need to promote and protect public
confidence, it is difficult to characterize one as dominant. For example,
the British Government's White Paper,5' which sought to set out the
46. 1968/09/27, 1968 O.J. 189.
47. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982 (Eng.).
48. See BARRY RIDER & H.L. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979);
BARRY RIDER, INSIDER TRADING (1983); Barry Rider, Insider Trading? A Crime of Our Times, 42
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 47 (1989) (Eng.).
49. In England, there were laws as early as the reign of Edward I that sought to ensure the
integrity of public markets and the ancient offenses of forestalling, engrossing, and regrating still
survive today within conspiracy to defraud, see RUSSELL ON CRIME (J. Turner ed., 12th ed. 1964).
50. See generally C. GOODHART ET AL., THE OPERATION AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS (1987); L.S. SEALY, COMPANY LAW AND COMMERCIAL REALITY (1984); L.S. Sealy,
Tomorrow's Company Law, 2 COMPANY LAW. 195 (1981) (Eng.).
51. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 17; Barry Rider, Analysis and Appraisal of The City
Revolution, in THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT (CCH, 1986);
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legislative aims of the new law, advocates increased competition as a
means of improving both integrity and competence within the industry.
Many would consider this highly debatable.'2
2. Malaysia. -The Malaysian laws are, with respect no profounder
in their logic or application. The Securities Industry Act of 1983," as
amended, borrows significantly from outdated and suspended legislation
in Australia. Indeed, the philosophy of the relevant New South Wales
and Victorian provisions, while perhaps more discernible than the British
legislation, is highly questionable as appropriate for Malaysia. The
Malaysian markets and financial services industry are very different from
those in Australia or for that matter anywhere else. The economic and
political policies that have circumscribed the development of market
capitalism in Malaysia are hardly mirrored in an economy such as that
in New South Wales.
In any case, in many respects, the philosophical foundations of the
Australian law have themselves been shaken if not undermined by
subsequent thinking and events. Sadly, more recent Malaysian
legislation, such as The Securities Commission Act of 1992, 5 indicates
that few if any lessons have been learned in this context. It too is a
mish-mash of philosophies that rest ill at ease with each other. To place
in one agency responsibility for promoting the markets and at the same
time regulating and policing them is considered by many commentators
to be a recipe for disaster. 5
L.C.B. Gower, Big Bang and City Regulation, [1988] M.L.R 1 (Eng.); Barry Rider, Protecting the
Prudent Investor, 6 COMPANY LAW. 54 (1985) (Eng.).
52. See generally BARRY RIDER, REPORT COMMISSIONED BY THE F.P.L.C., A MALAYSIAN
S.E.C. (1991) [hereinafter MALAYSIAN S.E.C.].
53. The Securities Industry Act, 1983 (Malay.).
54. See The Securities Commission Act, 1992 (Malay.). See also Barry Rider, Policing The
Malaysian Markets, Paper Submitted to Malaysian F.P.L.C (1992) (on file with author).
55. For example, section 15(1)(k) of the Securities Commission Act provides that the Securities
Commission shall be responsible for encouraging development of the securities and future markets
in Malaysia. The Securities Commission Act, 1992, s. 15(1)(k) (Malay.). At the same time, section
15(1)(i) provides that the Commission should "suppress illegal, dishonourable and improper
practices . . . ." Id. Indeed, profound doubts have arisen as to the viability of protecting private
investors and creating competitive markets for professional investors within a single law in Britain.
See A. LARGE, MAKING THE TWO TIER SYSTEM WORK (1993).
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V. The Policemen
A. Britain
Prior to the Financial Services Act of 1986, there were certain
statutory provisions regulating the British investment industry and the
purchase and sale of securities. Under the Companies Acts and the
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958,56 the structure of
regulation was essentially self-regulatory. Although there was
considerable discussion as to the effectiveness of this system it became
increasingly apparent that it could not deal with fraud and thus, could not
adequately protect investors. 7
In 1986, a committee under Lord Justice Roskill, appointed to
consider the form and conduct of fraud trials, reported that "the public
no longer believes that the system . . . is capable of bringing the
perpetrators of serious fraud expeditiously and effectively to book. The
overwhelming weight of evidence laid before us suggests that the public
is right."58 Although a certain amount of "tinkering" with the system
of supervision and regulation took place prior to the Financial Services
Act of 1986,"9 it was generally the view that a system of self-regulation
was inadequate given the developments that had taken place in the market
and the way in which business was transacted. The Government
appointed Professor L.C.B. Gower in 1981 to review and report on the
adequacy of the regulatory scheme and both during his inquiries and
subsequently, he made it clear that he favored the establishment of a new
56. Companies Act, 1985 (Eng.); Prevention of Frauds (Investments) Act, 1958 (Eng.). See
generally R. PENNINGTON, supra note 42, at 49. C.M. SCHMITTHOFF, COMMERCIAL LAW IN A
CHANGING ECONOMIC CLIMATE 27 (1974); C.M. Schmitthoff, Remarks at a Conference Organized
by the International Faculty of Securities Regulation in London (1976) (on file with author) ("[Als
regards investor protection, it would only be a slight exaggeration to maintain that we have no law
at all.").
57. See M. CLARKE, REGULATING THE CITY (1985); T. HADDEN, THE CONTROL OF COMPANY
FRAUD (1968); T. Hadden, Fraud in the City, Enforcing the Rules, 1 COMPANY LAW. 9 (1980).
See generally THE THIRD REPORT OF THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY SELECT COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF
COMMONS, U.K. PARLIAMENT, COMPANY INVESTIGATIONS (1990).
58. REPORT OF THE FRAUD TRIAL COMMITTEE (1986) (Eng.). A report prepared by a special
working party convened by the Director of Public Prosecutions had come to a similar conclusion in
1979.
59. See generally The Regulation of Corporation and Securities Laws in Britain, supra note 28,
at 30; Barry Rider, The British Council for the Securities Industry, 42 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 303
(1978); Barry Rider & E. Hew, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATION AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD
OF CORPORATION AND SECURITIES LAWS AND BRITAIN, 41 REVUE DE BANQUE 83 (1977).
Professor L.C.B. Gower, for one, advocated the need for a British Securities and Exchange
Commission. See supra note 17.
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authority along the lines of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission - a view shared by many - outside the City."
It would be unjust and unhelpful to judge the Financial Services Act
too harshly until the "dust settles."61 The system established in the Act
is a curious mixture, however, as it provides for both official regulation
and supervision on the basis of direct statutory authority and various
permutations of delegated and indirect authority.62
The Financial Services Act does provide the various new regulatory
bodies and the British Department of the Trade and Industry with a
number of significant powers. Such powers include the ability to require
cooperation in conducting inquiries, and, in certain circumstances, the
ability to actually intervene and control the actual conduct of business.
It is not necessary to detail all these powers here.' What is of more
relevance is the scant attention that has been paid to the institutional
aspects of effective supervision and surveillance in this area. To a very
significant extent, various regulatory authorities are not in a position to
adequately or competently exercise their various powers because they
lack the resources, manpower, and perhaps even the willingness to do so.
When the Act first came into being, enforcement took a relatively
low priority.' Few authorities sought to give any real attention to the
60. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 3.12. See also Big Bang and City Regulation, supra
note 51, at 1. Many have expressed the view that it is inevitable that sooner or later Britain will
have to establish a securities and exchange commission, see BARRY RIDER, POLICING THE CITY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (Kings College, London University, 1994). Already the British Securities and
Investments Board, which is incorporated as a private company with limited liability, is perceived
by many as taking unto itself more and more responsibility in the area of enforcement. See LARGE,
supra note 55, at 42. See also infra notes 65-67.
61. The present author has already attracted criticism from none other than the Securities and
Investment Board for expressing disquiet about the present arrangements, see Barry Rider, Policing
the City, supra note 35.
62. See Barry Rider, Self-regulation: The British Approach to Policing Conduct in the
Securities Business, with Particular Reference to the Role of the City Panel on Take-Overs and
Mergers in the Regulation of Insider trading, 1 J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.. 319 (1978).
Regardless of what jurists might argue about the normative and educative effect of rules that remain
in practical terms unenforced, common sense would incline towards Professor Gower's view that
a Securities and Exchange Commission needed to be established. See supra text accompanying note
59. The Government, which by no means was wholly receptive to Professor Gower's proposals,
did accept the need to ensure that the new scheme of regulation was properly policed, however.
63. See generally CCH GUIDE, supra note 20, at 52.
64. See generally Policing the City, supra note 35, at 61 (citing the statement of the first
chairman of the Securities and Investments Board, namely that "I [the chairman] am a regulator, a
watchdog and a policeman - in that order."). The chairman of the Malaysian Securities
Commission, Dato' Dr. Munir, has taken the same stance, although he has more recently
emphasized the significance of enforcement. C. Dato' Dr. Munir, Chairman, Malaysian Securities
Commission, Address at the Second Regional Symposium on Economic Crime in Kuala Lumpur
(1993); Dato' Dr. Munir, Chairman, Malaysian Securities Commission, Address at the Third
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needs of this important function. In a number of instances, wholly
unsuitable individuals that lacked expertise were recruited. In a system
that requires confidence in its efficiency and integrity for its credibility,
this was a potential disaster. Fortunately, over the last two or three
years, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) has addressed these
issues with a good deal more determination and foresight, and there is
now the germ of credibility in the system.s Unfortunately, the British
Government has itself shown no greater willingness to take institutional
aspects of enforcement more seriously. The Department of Trade and
Industry and the Treasury,' aside from losing several key officials to
the new authorities, has experienced considerable difficulty in recruiting
competent lawyers and enforcement personnel. For example, the section
that deals with insider dealing cases relies, by its own admission, almost
exclusively on the Insider Dealing Unit of The London Stock Exchange
for detection and preliminary investigation.' Given the virtual absence
of effective policing in the corporate securities industry prior to 1986, it
is perhaps not surprising that there is not only a dearth of suitable
"regulators," but also little relevant expertise.
B. Malaysia
The experience in Malaysia, and many other countries, has not been
too different. Regulatory experience in Malaysia is at a premium and the
Malaysian Securities Commission must be congratulated in its ability to
have attracted a number of well-qualified young professionals from
Regional Symposium in Kuala Lumpur (1994).
65. As has already been pointed out, the SIB is a private company with certain legal privileges
given to it under the Financial Service Act of 1986. The SIB and its officers are immune from civil
claims in regard to their official actions, unless they act in bad faith. Members of the Board are
appointed by the Government and Bank of England. The SIB reports on an annual basis to the
Department of Trade and Industry, which then reports to Parliament. See also supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
66. The powers that were afforded to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Financial
Services Act, have now been transferred in the main to the Treasury.
67. The London Stock Exchange's Insider Dealing Group is responsible for monitoring and
investigating instances of possible insider abuse on the stock market. While it operates within a
contractual and self-regulatory jurisdiction, it is possible for either the Department of Trade and
Industry or the SIB to appoint members of the Unit to conduct investigations or prosecutions and
thereby have access to the statutory powers of investigation in the Financial Services Act of 1986.
Controversy has centered on the "economics" of the Department of Trade and Industry and Treasury
appointing very expensive barristers and accountants to conduct its inspections under the provisions
of The Companies Act 1985. Indeed, every effort is made to persuade the Stock Exchange to
continue the investigation, given the cost implications. See generally THIRD REPORT OF THE TRADE
AND INDUSTRY SELECT COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, U.K. PARLIAMENT, COMPANY
INVESTIGATIONS (1990).
GLOBAL TRENDS IN SECURITIES REGULATION
government departments and the private sector to its ranks. It remains
to be seen, however, whether such individuals contemplate a long term
career with the Commission. This is reflected in the embryo compliance
industry that has been forced into an ambivalent existence in Britain.
While Malaysia identifies compliance as a separate management
responsibility in the case of banks, it has not yet been so recognized in
the financial services industry. Of course, the Malaysian Securities
Commission is well aware of the importance of creating a compliance
culture serviced by a compliance industry, but at present it is doubtful
whether the resources in term of manpower and expertise exist to fashion
an effective compliance regime in most businesses.
An article such as this does not have the opportunity to trace the
historical development of securities regulation in Malaysia. Of course,
the Malaysian stock market in Kuala Lumpur is not new and has a
history that dates back to the end of the last century. Securities
regulation in Malaysia has developed pragmatically and has often been
used to further specific economic and political objectives, in addition to
simply creating an efficient capital market and financial services industry.
The pragmatic development of regulation is reflected in the number and
diversity of organizations involved in administering the markets. Indeed,
one of the reasons for creating the Malaysian Securities Commission in
1993 was to provide a "one-stop agency. "' As a result, however,
while a good deal of centralization of authority has been achieved, there
are still a number of other bodies with responsibility for matters
pertaining to the nation's capital markets. Nevertheless, the Securities
Commission is given regulatory and enforcement oversight over all of
these entities and inevitably, it is in this oversight that the success of this
new regulatory system will be judged.
C. Enforcing Regulation in Criminal Courts
Much of the discussion that took place as to the adequacy of the
various structures of British regulation has focused on the ability of those
charged with policing the British financial services industry to secure
convictions before the ordinary criminal courts for fraud and abuses,
such as insider dealing.' The same is equally true in Malaysia.
Indeed, "perhaps one of the most serious ills of the securities industry is
the perilous yet elusive abuse called insider trading . insider trading
68. See generally A MALAYSIAN S.E.C., supra note 52.
69. See B. HANNINGAN, INSIDER DEALING (1988); Strongin Dodds, Blowing the Whistle on
Foul Play in the City, FINANCIAL DECISIONS, Apr. 1989, at 35.
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is one of the most serious threats to the Malaysian securities markets."7
This concern is not new. In 1878, the British Royal Commission
on the Stock Exchange, appointed under Lord Penzance, reported
expressing concern about the enforceability of the various rules and
regulations and calling for responsibility for policing these laws to be
placed on a "public functionary."' Attempts were made during the
1970s and early 1980s to improve the prosecution of fraud cases in
England, namely by the strengthening of the Director of Public
Prosecutions staff and the creation of Fraud Investigation Groups.72
However, prosecution is only one factor in combatting fraud. As the
committee sitting under Lord Justice Roskill observed,73 deficiencies in
the procedures for investigation and in the trial process itself are equal
stumbling blocks.
1. Authority to Investigate. -As a result of the recommendations of
the Roskill Committee, the Criminal Justice Act of 1987 provided for the
establishment of the Serious Frauds Office (SFO).7 ' The Act entrusts
far-ranging powers of investigation to the Director of this Office, powers
virtually analogous to those afforded by the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Companies Act of 1985 and the Financial Services
Act of 1986. 7" However, the powers afforded the Director of the SFO
is predicated on the basis that the matter involves a "serious or complex
fraud. "76
Similarly, The Malaysian Registrar of Companies, under the
Companies Act of 1965 and Securities Industry Act of 1983,7" has like
powers of inquiry. However, section 38 of the Securities Commission
Act of 1992 gives investigating officers appointed by the Commission the
power to demand evidence, which can then be used against the alleged
70. Puan Zainun Ali, Registrar of Companies, Address at the Fifth Annual Conference of the
Securities Industry in Malaysia (Sept. 5, 1989).
71. Gov'T PRINTER (1878).
72. D. LANHAM ET AL., CRIMINAL FRAUD (Law Book Company, 1987); S. Froomkin,
Problems of Investigating and Prosecuting Commercial Cnme Offences, [19851 II C.L.B. No. 2;
Barry Rider, Report to the Attorney General of Hong Kong on Combatting Commercial Crime
(1979) (on file with author).
73. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
74. Criminal Justice Act, 1987 (Eng.).
75. See supra part V.A.
76. The Director's powers of investigation under section 2 of the Act are almost a unique
example of such powers being vested in the prosecutor in England. Criminal Justice Act, 1987, s.2
(Eng.). It has been remarked that in this regard the process is similar to the inquisitorial powers of
an examining magistrate in civil law systems.
77. Companies Act, 1965 (Malay.); Securities Commission Act, 1992, s. 38 (1992) (Malay.).
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fraud perpetrator.7" As such, the Malaysian legislation is broader than
the investigatory provisions in any of the British legislation.7" In
Britain, evidence demanded from an alleged fraud perpetrator can not be
used other than in cross-examination. That is, it cannot be used in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.
2. Authority to Prosecute.-While there is little doubt that the
establishment of the SFO in Britain and the resources that it has been
able to attract are more than significant advances in the right direction,
its impact on the policing of securities laws remains a little uncertain.
Indeed, although the Office has not shown a reluctance to concern itself
with frauds in the investment world, it interprets its statutory mandate
restrictively. Consequently, as stated by an Assistant Director of the
SFO: "Insider dealing on its own is essentially a regulatory offence, and
as such is unlikely to qualify . . . ." This rather rigid and possibly
naive approach is to be regretted.81
In Malaysia, all prosecutions require the consent of the Public
Prosecutor, although under the Securities Commission Act of 1992, the
Securities Commission can, subject to the requirement of consent from
the Public Prosecutor, conduct prosecutions itself.' Whether there
would be advantage in Malaysia having a Serious Frauds Office is a
much wider question. Malaysia, has not had a particularly good record
in securing convictions for serious cases of economic crime, in common
with many other countries some of which already possess a specialized
prosecutorial agency that deals with investment fraud.
VI. Civil Enforcement
It is unfortunate that the foregoing discussion of the effectiveness of
securities law and corporate regulation in Britain and Malaysia has
focused so much on the traditional criminal justice system. It has long
been recognized that effective control and regulation of financial markets
78. The Securities Commission Act, 1992, s. 38 (Malay.).
79. See, e.g., The Companies Act, 1985 (Eng.); The Financial Services Act, 1986 (Eng.); The
Criminal Justice Act, 1987 (Eng.).
80. Letter from Assistant Director of the Serious Fraud Office (Dec. 7, 1988); see also.
Criminal Justice Act, 1987, s. 1(3) (delineating what constitutes a "serious or complex" fraud is left
to the Director to determine "on reasonable grounds"); C. Wolman, UK Treads Carefully Over
Insider Dealing, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989.
81. For a discussion of insider dealing enforcement see BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, INSIDER
CRIME (1993); BARRY RIDER, INSIDER TRADING (1983); Barry Rider, The Policing of Insider
Trading in Britain, in EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING REGULATION (1991). In regard to Malaysia,
see BARRY RIDER AND H.L. FFRENC4, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979).
82. Securities Commission Act, 1992 (Malay.).
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involves devices other and in addition to the ordinary criminal law.83
For example, the Statute of 1697, "To Restrain the number and ill
Practice bf Brokers and Stockjobbers," contained provisions that sought
to regulate the embryonic securities industry in a manner not too
different from that under the Financial Services Act of 1986. Brokers
had to be licensed and be of "proven value." Not only where they
required to eschew fraud, but also to "adhere to good and fair
principles." The Act required the posting of bonds for good behavior
and indemnity. There were also provisions for the recording of
bargains." In this early law, one can discern such concepts as
"authorization," "fit and proper" and even the notion that the "spirit" is
more important than the "letter" of the rule.85 Of course, in practical
terms, adequate control and vetting of those seeking admission to the
securities industry or the markets and the prudential regulation of such
is likely to be far more cost effective than resort to the criminal law on
an ex post facto basis.
The criminal law has not proven to be an efficient device in
combatting economic crime for a host of technical, practical, procedural,
and institutional reasons.86 It operates at a high level of proof, is
generally slow and over-exacting in its procedures, and is restrictive and
unimaginative in the evidence it will allow to be adduced and applied.
Few jurisdictions have achieved significant success in relying primarily,
let alone exclusively, on this blunt and very expensive tool in regulating
and controlling abuses in the financial markets. Even the Royal
Commission sitting under Lord Penzance in 1878 recognized that the
criminal law was too inflexible and slow.87 Of course, when one
considers the sort of developments that have taken place in the financial
markets since the time of Lord Penzance's deliberations, the problems
facing the criminal justice system are so much greater.
Internationalization of the markets is a major difficulty operating to
confound detection, fragment and diversify investigations, place
83. For a somewhat exotic example, see the rules relating to stabilization of the commodity
markets in China, see G. BouLAIs, 55 MANUEL DU CODE CHINOIS, 754b (Varieties Sinologiques,
Shanghai, 1924) (prohibiting persons from rural areas from purchasing more than a shih of rice in
Peking). See also THE MARKET IN HISTORY (B. Anderson & A. Latham eds., 1986).
84. See AN ACT TO PREVENT THE INFAMOUS PRACTICE OF STOCK-JOBBING 1734 (The
International Stock Exchange, 1986).
85. See, e.g., General Principle 1, U.K. City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers and The
Principles, Care Conduct of Business Rules, S.I.B. (1992).
86. See generally Barry Rider, Combating International Commercial Crime, 2 L.M.C.L.Q.
217 (1985).
87. See supra note 71.
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witnesses and evidence out of evidential and often financial reach, and
render conventional criminal processes ineffectual or excessively
expensive.
A. The U.S. Example
The civil law is far more likely to provide a reasonably effective
enforcement tool than the criminal law. In certain jurisdictions, most
noticeably that of the United States, the civil law has long been used to
assist in the enforcement of what are essentially penal or regulatory
laws. 8 For example, under section 21(d) of The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission is
empowered to bring suit to enjoin violations not only of the federal laws
but various rules and regulations made under the authority of such. 9
It is through this expedience that the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission has achieved such comparative success in policing both the
general antifraud provisions in the U.S. federal laws and insider abuse.
By bringing injunctive suit against those suspected of violating the
Federal law, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been relatively
successful in securing a court order enjoining future violations,
disgorgement of profits, and certain other undertakings, such as entering
into an approved in-house compliance procedure. Given the tremendous
cost involved in litigation and the stance of the Commission, in a good
proportion of these proceedings, the court orders have been made
consequential, as the defendants are willingly to accept the injunction and
other orders, rather than risking the costs, inconvenience, and disclosures
of a long trial. The importance of such an order, however, is that a
further violation of the relevant law or rule will amount to contempt of
court.
Regulatory authorities in other jurisdictions have shown far less
courage than that of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in
seeking the assistance of the civil courts in policing the securities
markets. Of course, much depends upon the receptiveness of the courts.
For example, until recently, the English courts have not always exhibited
great eagerness to become involved in this area.' However, section 61
of the Financial Services Act of 1986, 9' now provides both the British
88. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Little Brown, 2d ed.)
[hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION].
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-80c-3 (1988).
90. For example, in Prudential Assurance Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) 1981 Ch.
257, Lord Justice Templeman stated that "in our view the voluntary regulation is a matter for the
City. The compulsory regulation of companies is a matter for Parliament." Id.
91. See The Financial Services Act, 1986, s.6 (1986) (Eng.) (pertaining to unauthorized
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Department of Trade and Industry and the Securities and Investments
Board with a statutory power to apply to the courts for injunctions and
restitution orders in cases of certain violations of the Act and rules made
under its statutory authority.' 2 It remains to be seen whether this power
will be used with the same degree of enthusiasm that the U.S. agencies
have exhibited in bringing civil enforcement suits. While the British
Securities and Investments Board has on several occasions indicated that
it attaches practical significance to this power, it remains uncertain
whether sufficient resources will be made available for it to be fashioned
into the sort of weapon that plays an important role in the United
States. 93
In the context of Malaysia, it is doubted whether the Malaysian
Securities Commission has the legal power to bring similar civil actions.
Section 16 of the Securities Commission Act of 1992 states that "[t]he
Commission shall have all such powers as may be necessary to carry out
its functions under this Act. "I It has been contended that this broad
provision gives the Commission the power to entertain civil enforcement
suits. However, the flaw with this argument is that the section does not
address the issue of locus standi. The Commission would not have locus
standi to proceed in a civil action against someone who had breached for
example a provision of the Securities Industry Act or one of the
Commission's own rules. Obviously, this is a serious weakness in the
Malaysian legislation and one that requires urgent attention. 95
B. International Implications
Not only is civil enforcement often quicker, cheaper and more
effective than the laborious processes of the criminal law, it does have
a far greater potential for reaching overseas.' It is an accepted, and
indeed, a fundamental principal of international law that one state will
investment business). This provision has been used already on a number of occasions.
92. See generally CCH GUIDE, supra note 20, at 192.
93. Note also the creation of a statutory tort action for "private investors" under section 62 of
the Financial Services Act of 1986 for breaches of both the anti-fraud and manipulation provisions
of section 47 of the Act and the Conduct of Business Rules. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ss.
47, 62 (1986) (Eng.).
94. Securities Commission Act, 1992, s. 16 (Malay.).
95. Under section 100 of the Securities Industry Act of 1983, the Registrar of Companies does
have authority to apply to the High Court for orders in relation to breaches of the Securities Industry
Act 1983, as does the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in regard to its own rules. Securities Act,
1983, s. 100 (Malay.).
96. See generally Barry Rider, A safe haven forfraud?, 10 COMPANY LAw. 46 (1989) (Eng.);
BARRY RIDER & CHAIKIN, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: A COMMONWEALTH
PERSPECTIVE (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1983).
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not enforce another's penal law.' No such rule exists in regard to the
civil law. Given the incidence of serious international fraud, a number
of courts have been prepared to seize this possibility to allow and
facilitate the pursuit of fraudsters and their ill-gotten gains. Although it
may not be acceptable for the Hong Kong courts to directly enforce U.S.
anti-insider dealing laws, they can order a bank in Hong Kong to freeze
money in an account that is the proceeds of insider dealing on the basis
that the bank has knowledge that the money was obtained in breach of
trust and, therefore, on ordinary trust law principles the bank has also
become a constructive trustee.
English courts have also been prepared to order that assets should
not be removed from its jurisdiction in circumstances where litigation has
commenced or is about to be commenced and is likely that property
within the jurisdiction will not fully satisfy a judgment.'e Indeed, in
exceptional circumstances, English courts have been prepared to order
defendants to disclose not only their assets within its jurisdiction,' but
outside the jurisdiction and to freeze the transfer of such."° The courts
have also been prepared in the context of civil actions to prevent
defendants and potential defendants from leaving the jurisdiction. 10 1
Furthermore, courts are far more likely to respond to a decision of
97. DICEY & MORRIS, ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Stevens ed., 1 lth ed.). See also AG of
New Zealand v. Ortiz, [19841 A.C. 1 (Eng.); Re State of Norway's Applications [1989] 1 All E.R.
745 (Eng.); AG for The U.K. v. Heinemann, [1988] 78 A.L.R. 449 (Eng.).
98. Nanus Asia Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, High Court of Hong Kong 1 H.K.L.R. 396
(H.K. High Ct. 1990). Note also the approach in AG for the U.K. v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd.,
[19881 1 N.Z.L.R 129 (New Zealand). See generally Barry Rider, Fei Chien Laundries and The
Pursuit of Flying Money, 1 J. OF INT'L PLANNING 77 (1992) [hereinafter Pursuit of Flying Money].
99. See generally Supreme Court Act, 1987, s. 37 (Eng.); Mareva Comania Naviera v.
International Bulk Carriers, 2 LLOYDS REP. 509 (1975); Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S.
Lines, Inc. [19891 2 W.L.R. 109 (Eng.). Similar proceedings to freeze money in bank accounts or
other property have been brought by law enforcement agencies in relation to the proceeds of fraud.
See West Mercia Constabulary v. Wagner, 3 All E.R. 378 (1981) (Eng.); Chief Constable of Kent
v. V, [19831 Q.B. 34. But note the limitations of the common law in regard to derivative property
in Chief Constable of Leicestershire v. M, 1 W.L.R 20 (Eng.) (1989). Additionally, note the
provisions in regard to "profitable" crimes in Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 relating to
restraint of property and confiscature. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, pt. V (Eng.); see also D.
Feldman, CRIMINAL CONFISCATION ORDERS - THE NEW LAW (1988). Butterworth. In regard to
disclosure of assets see Bankers Book Evidence Act, 1879, s. 7 (Eng); A v. C, 2 All E.R. 1980
(1980); Bankers Trust v. Shapira 2 W.C.R. 174 (1980) (Eng.).
100. Babanaft International v. Bassatne, 2 W.L.R. 232 (1989); Derby & Co. v. Weldon, 2
W.L.R. 276 (1989) (Eng.); Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier 2 W.L.R. 261 (1989) (Eng.). Note also
the flexibility of the English courts in regard to service of process on defendants who are out of their
jurisdiction. See Barclays Bank of Switzerland v. Hahn, 1 W.L.R. 13 (1989) (Eng.).
101. See, e.g., J. MCCLEAN AND W. PATCHETT, ThE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS AND THE SERVICE OF PROCESS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979).
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another tribunal in a civil matter, than they are a criminal or panel
judgment.
As one might expect, U.S. courts have been no less imaginative
than their English cousins. The Singapore Courts have also shown
themselves willing and able to use the civil law effectively against
international fraudsters, such as in the Pertimina bribes litigation. It
remains to be seen whether the Malaysian Courts will be as bold."°2
More emphasis should be placed on the civil law in policing the
securities markets, particularly in regard to abuses such as insider dealing
and market frauds." Some jurisdictions have already gone a little
down this road."c4 Others are actively considering creating specific
civil actions for breaches of regulatory provisions. While it would not
be appropriate for the civil law to replace the prospect of criminal
liability, the civil law should be allowed to function as a more flexible
and probably efficacious tool. In the case of insider dealing regulation,
there is considerable advantage in an express right of action being given
by statute to the issuer of securities in which the insider dealing takes
place. While it may be difficult to justify such an action on traditional
principles of loss, causation and reliance, this liability would not be
compensatory or for that matter restitutionary as it is, for example under
the Malaysian legislation. 5 It would exist simply to deprive the
wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains and operate through the intermediation
of the issuer which has at least some interest in achieving "a fair market"
in its shares.
C. Other Means of Civil Enforcement
There are of course other devices that can be utilized to improve not
only the mechanisms of enforcement, but the detection of abuse in the
first place."°  Increasing attention, especially by the Kuala Lumpur
102. Mr. Justice George, speaking at the Second Regional Symposium on Economic Crime,
Kuala Lumpur 1993, expressed his personal support for the developments that have taken place in
other Commonwealth jurisdictions and said that he would be well disposed to such authorities if cited
in an appropriate case before his court. Justice George, Address at Second Regional Symposium
on Economic Crime in Kuala Lumpur (1993) (copy on file with author).
103. BARRY RIDER, THE UNACCEPTABLE INSIDER (Legal Research Foundation, University of
Auckland, 1987); Pursuit of Flying Money, supra note 98, at 77.
104. See Securities Law Reform Act, 1989, (N.Z.).
105. See Malaysian Companies Act 1965, s. 132A (Malay.); Securities Industry Act, 1983, ss.
89-91 (Malay.).
106. In regard to the use of "timely disclosure" obligations see Barry Rider, Insider Trading -
A Question of Confidence, 77 L.S. GAZ. 113 (1980); Barry Rider, PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES
EXCHANGE LAW OF BARBADOS 85 (1981). See also Sectirities Exchange Act, 1982, ss. 58, 59
(Barbados).
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Stock Exchange, is being given to various forms of stock market
surveillance. However, little attention has been given to other forms of
monitoring except in regard to the prudential regulation of financial
intermediaries solvency. The area of loss prevention and minimization
is probably one of the most important in the regulation and control of all
forms of economic abuse. Despite the development of these various
mechanisms, there is little evidence of the development or refinement of
effective systems.
For example, in Britain, the various self-regulatory agencies have
the primary responsibility for "authorizing" those active in the
investment business. They are required to satisfy themselves that before
such a person is permitted to operate such a business he is a "fit and
proper person." This obviously involves applicants. While most
authorities operate rather elementary "vetting" procedures, these are
nevertheless capable of offering information with which application could
prove invaluable in discharging other regulatory functions. Sadly, until
very recently, little emphasis has been placed on the use of this
information for intelligence, and thus, preventative purposes. In
Malaysia, there is a dearth of information that is needed for the
development of efficacious screening."
Another aspect of loss prevention that receives scant attention in
most jurisdictions is the adequate policing of disclosure and reporting
obligations. In most regulatory systems there are various reporting
obligations imposed on enterprises and those involved in the financial
services industry. Usually one of the first indications that something is
amiss is that the reporting obligations will be ignored or that false
information will be provided. However, enforcement of these provisions
is invariably given a very low institutional priority.
There are, of course, many other ways in which securities
regulation can be rendered more effective. One particularly fruitful
approach is to concentrate regulation and liability much more on the
"facilitators" of abusive or illegal conduct. To some extent this has
already occurred in the United States"~ and to a lesser extent in
107. See BARRY RIDER, REPORT TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE BASE FOR ECONOMIC CRIMINALS (1991).
108. The Draft Federal Securities Code, which is essentially a restatement of the present law,
provides the following:
[An] agent or other person who knowingly causes or gives substantial assistance to
conduct by another person giving rise to liability under the Code. . . with knowledge
that the conduct is unlawful or a breach of duty, or involves a fraudulent or manipulative
act, a misrepresentation, or nondisclosure of a material fact by an insider .... is liable
as a principal. A person may cause or give substantial assistance to conduct by inaction
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Britain,"1° but not in Malaysia. By using aider and abettor concepts,
and even the law of conspiracy," it is possible to throw a significantly
wider net of liability at all levels of regulation - civil as well as
criminal. Developing notions of "control liability""' and placing
specific obligations on those in a supervisory role to ensure at least the
minimum effectiveness of compliance"' are all steps in the right
direction. On the whole, the professional advisors and intermediaries
who knowingly or recklessly, and perhaps even negligently, facilitate the
commission of securities frauds and other abuses, betray the trust and
respect that society places in professionalism and ethics." 3
Furthermore, from a purely pragmatic standpoint, given their standing
and the essentially facilitative role, advisors and intermediaries constitute
relatively easy targets within jurisdiction. They are also, by virtue of the
professional constraints within which they operate, far more susceptible
to other regulatory procedures and investigations. For example, they
will be bound to comply with more onerous recording and reporting
provisions, violations of which are themselves grounds for enforcement
action against them.
What is certain, however, is that there are no panaceas in policing
the financial markets domestically, let alone internationally. Regulation
in this complex area of economic activity is a multifaceted problem
calling for a diversified and flexible response from law enforcement and
those charged with regulatory oversight. To attempt to address these
essentially property-related crimes, which generally occur within a very
limited social and geographic environment, with tools fashioned by the
criminal courts several hundred years ago, is like trying to fight a
nuclear war with King Henry II's bow and arrow!
VII. The Violators
A factor that has not generally been recognized in policing the
securities markets today, and which affects regulation at all levels, is not
only the sophistication of the modem violator or offender, but the
or silence when he has a duty to act or speak.
See FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 88, at 1016.
109. See, e.g., AGIP v. Jackson, 4 All E.R. 385, 451 (1992) (Eng.).
110. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, U.S.C. §§ i962(a), 1964 (1988).
111. See FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 88, at 101. See
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 88, at 101.
112. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e(a) (50), 780(),
78t-1, 78u-1, 78kk(c), 806-4a (1988 & Supp. 1993).
113. YB Dato' Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar, Malaysian Minister of Law, Address at The Third
Regional Symposium on Economic Crime in Kuala Lumpur (Mar. 28, 1994).
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increasing amount of evidence that organized crime regards securities
frauds as a low risk/high reward enterprise."' Although it is
dangerous and entirely counterproductive to overemphasize both the
extent and capabilities of organized crime, it is even more irresponsible
to ignore the very real threat.1"  Although police agencies have
different perceptions of organized crime, it is clear that in recent years
both traditional and other forms of organized crime have increasingly
moved into "white collar crime," in particular securities frauds.116
There are numerous examples where traditional organized crime families
have become directly or indirectly involved in various forms of securities
fraud and manipulations. Their activities have ranged from simple theft
of script to sophisticated schemes to market worthless shares or
manipulate markets." 7 Some groups have used the traditional tools of
violence, corruption, and extortion to enhance their frauds and
manipulations. There have been instances where corporate executives
have been blackmailed or bribed into betraying corporate confidences so
that information can be sold and utilized for dealing or for some other
profitable purpose. Indeed, some organized crime groups in Japan-the
so called "Sokaiya"-have more or less moved wholly into this form of
criminal activity.
Not only is organized crime concerned with engaging in various
forms of fraud to make money, which can then be used for investing in
114. COMMUNIQUE TO COMMONWEALTH LAW MINISTERS MEETING, HARARE, ZIMBABWE
para. 59 (1986) ("Ministers recognised an increasing trend of organised crime to become involved
in economic offences, as these offer high rewards with relatively little risk of apprehension."). This
development was also acknowledged by Commonwealth Law Ministers at their meetings in Canada
in 1977, in Barbados in 1980, in Sri Lanka in 1983, and by the Commonwealth Heads of
Government at their meeting in the Bahamas in November 1987. The United Nations has on a
number of occasions specifically recognized the move of organized crime into the sphere of
economic crime and destabilisation, see for example, Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat on Maritime
Fraud, Items 3 and 4 of Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/AC4/8 (1985), and the
resolution of the Seventh Congress of the United Nations on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
on organized crime. Other organizations such as ICPO-Interpol and the Customs Cooperation
Council have not been slow to acknowledge this development either.
115. See SHIPMAN& B. RIDER, supra note 41; Barry Rider, Organised Economic Crime Report
to the Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, UK Parliament (1994). See also ORGANISED
ECONOMIC CRIME, (Commonwealth Secretariat 1986); Barry Rider, The Financial World at Risk:
The Dangers of Organised Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption, 8 MANAGERIAL AUDITING
J. 3 (1993).
116. See generally Organised Crime, 53d ANZAAS Cong., at 23 (May 20, 1983) (Australian
Government Printer, D. Meagher ed., 1983); U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY (1986); Papers of
Conference Organized by the General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol (Feb. 14-15, 1989) (copy on file
with author).
117. See M.G. Yeager, The Gangster as White Collar Criminal: Organised Crime and Stolen
Securities in THE CRIME SOCIETY 47 (1976).
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other criminal enterprises or penetrating legitimate businesses,"' but
various methods have been developed to launder the proceeds of various
forms of crime ranging from simple robberies to illicit trafficking in
drugs. Many of these methods involve the securities markets and
financial intermediaries. The U.S. Presidential Commission on
Organized Crime, in its Interim Report to the President, stated that
"every financial institution ... should assume it is a potential target for
use by organized crime in money laundering schemes."1"9 The
Presidential Commission further noted that while the risk of money
laundering operations through financial institutions has been recognized
for some time, at least in the United States, "existing policies have
frequently proven inadequate to prevent criminals from using the services
of the services of these institutions."
The Stock Exchange in Britain" has also recognized this the
context of laundering profits from drug trafficking and has warned its
members accordingly. Of course, the risk to the financial intermediary
is not simply that of a criminal prosecution, but also in the attendant
corruption and loss of confidence. Furthermore, if effective action is to
be taken to discourage the commission of serious crimes that give rise to
such profits in the first place, it is vitally important that this money
should not become legitimized. 21
The problems facing those charged with combatting securities
offenses and abuses are bad enough, without the balance being even
further titled against them through the involvement of organized crime
118. See M. BERS, U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T, THE PENETRATION OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS BY
ORGANIZED CRIME (1970).
119. THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANISED CRIME. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY
LAUNDERING 1 (1984). See also E. Nadelman, Unlaundenng Dirty Money, 18 INTERAMERICAN
LAW REv. 33 (1986).
120. Letter to Member Firms from M.E. Fidler, Secretary to the Council (Oct. 14, 1986). The
Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales issued a similar statement on Dec. 14,
1987. The Chairman of The Securities and Futures Commission also drew attention to the dangers
facing those engaged in business in the financial sector in April 1993.
121. In Britain, it is considered preferable to seek the assistance of financial institutions on an
informal basis in reporting suspicious transactions to the authorities than imposing a formal reporting
requirement in regard to certain categories of transaction, is done under the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970 in the United States. See Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959 (1988). Nevertheless,
persons who knowingly assist in laundering the proceeds of a serious crime are, however, guilty of
an offense in Britain and this has encouraged a significant amount of cooperation in practice.
Additionally, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 makes it a crime to
be concerned in an arrangement whereby money is made available to a person "knowing or having
reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used by that person for purposes of terrorism."
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989 (Eng.). This imposes liability on a
lower standard of mens rea. See D. Wheatley, 1989] N.L.J. 499. See generally Drug Trafficking
Act, 1994 (Eng.); Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (Eng.).
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groups with access to very significant resources. Furthermore, organized
crime groups invariably have developed lines of access to financial and
other institutions overseas and operate with a considerably greater degree
of circumspection than the ordinary criminal. Sadly, it is also the case
that organized crime groups will generally not hesitate to use violence
and corruption to further decrease the chances of effective enforcement
against them.
VIII. International Cooperation
Faced with all these problems, it is not surprising that more and
more attention is being given to international and regional cooperation in
policing the securities markets."2  It is now generally accepted, even
in the United States, that cooperation is far more profitable in the long-
term than simply a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction
extraterritorially. 23 On the other hand, it is possible to have some
sympathy with Judge Owen, who, in an enforcement action brought by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to freeze the profit that
the defendant had made from insider dealing in a bank account in Hong
Kong, considered that "in Hong Kong they practically give you a medal
for doing this sort of thing [insider trading]" and thus, refused to defer
jurisdiction to the Hong Kong courts,"M As a result, Judge Cruden in
Hong Kong took the view that "this Court will always take whatever
effective steps are legally available to it under Hong Kong law, to deal
with illegal or morally reprehensible commercial conduct . . . ." By
way of rebuke to his New York colleague he asked "where a conflict of
law does arise . . . the dispute should be approached in a spirit of
judicial comity rather than judicial competitiveness., Whatever the
approach of other courts, this is the sympathetic approach followed by
this Court. "125
122. See Enforcement of the Securities Laws in AN INTERNATIONAL MARKET IN
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE U.S. CONGRESS (1987); S. Heberton & B. Gibson, 3
International Aspects of Securities Legislation in PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR
CANADA, (Government of Canada, 1979); W. Hasetine, supra note 5.
123. See REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT OF THE
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 11 (1988); J. GRUNDFEST, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT - A NEw U.S. INITIATIVE (1988).
124. See Nanus Asia Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 1 H.K.L.R. 396 (H.K. High Ct. 1990)
(H.K.).
125. Id. Insider dealing has long been a matter of interest to the authorities in Hong Kong, see
Barry Rider, Insider Trading: Hong Kong Style, 128 N.L.J. 897 (1978) (Eng.). See also Barry
Rider, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Hong Kong, 17 MALAY. L. REV. 310 (1979) (Malay.).
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While most legal systems do not deliberately attempt to frustrate the
law enforcement efforts of other nations, concern for sovereignty and the
inevitable lack of political and cultural interface in certain areas can
render meaningful cooperation unpredictable. Even in Commonwealth
countries, which share a common legal heritage and where specific legal
inhibitions on the exchange of information are rare, cooperation cannot
always be assured. In cases where mandatory procedures are required
before information can be secured, let alone furnished to a foreign
agency or tribunal, it is almost always necessary to establish "double
criminality" in the sense that the matter that is the basis of the inquiry or
request for assistance would also be a criminal offence had the relevant
conduct occurred within the jurisdiction of the country whose assistance
is sought.'26 Even where mandatory procedures are not necessary the
matter will generally only be considered sufficiently serious and, thus,
worthy of expending precious law enforcement resources upon, if the
relevant conduct is readily identifiable as criminal or highly anti-social.
This problem has manifested in countless occasions when the
authorities of a developing country have sought assistance from the
British government or police in regard to an exchange control matter,
which no matter how seriously it may be regarded overseas, is not
regarded in Britain as a crime or even a matter worthy in the main of
official interest. Of course, as the English Law Commissions's Working
Group"' recognized, a failure on the part of both countries to
126. There are, of course, a variety of procedures available for taking evidence out of
jurisdiction. In Britain, the main provision is contained in section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act
1988, which now governs the procedure for letters of request. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, s.
29 (Eng.); C. EMMINS AND G. SCANLAN, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
(1988). Where evidence is obtained pursuant to mandatory procedures at common law, it cannot
be passed to external authorities. See A.G. for Hong Kong v. Ocean Timber Transportation Ltd.
[1979] H.K.L.R. 298 (H.K.). Evidence can be obtained for foreign courts, where a criminal matter
is pending before that court, under both section 5 of the Extraction Act of 1873 and under the
Bankers Books Evidence Act of 1879. Extraction Act of 1873, s. 5 (Eng.); Bankers Books Evidence
Act, 1879 (Eng.).
The procedures for assisting foreign tribunals in civil matter are far less restrictive under the
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of 1875. See Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act, 1875 (Eng.). This Act has been generously interpreted by the English courts.
In Re State of Norway's Application, 1 All E.R. 745 (1989), the House of Lords held that a letter
of request issued by the Norwegian court did not amount to the attempted enforcement of Norwegian
revenue laws in England, but was merely seeking the assistance of the English courts to obtain
evidence to enable Norwegian revenue laws to be enforced.
The U.S. courts have always shown themselves willing to assist foreign agencies. See e.g.,
In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
127. JURISDICTION OVER FRAUD OFFENSES, supra note 22.
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appreciate the perspective of the other is highly damaging to international
cooperation in general terms.'28
A. Legislation Providing for Secrecy
In a number of jurisdictions, for a host of reasons-some more
acceptable than others-legislation has been enacted that provides for
secrecy of certain categories of information, or actually forbids,
disclosing such information to foreign authorities.'29 These secrecy
and blocking laws are usually more related to banking and financial
activities, such as the special secrecy provisions that apply to offshore
banks.1" In some countries, however, they extend to professional and
business information.'31  While most legal systems, even those
containing such provisions, permit the taking and disclosure of
information in limited circumstances, in practical terms the institutional
and cost factors tend to militate against the effectiveness of such
procedures. Furthermore, most systems require a criminal investigation
to be existent and are extremely careful to screen out "fishing
expeditions." Indeed, in the case of Offshore banks in Labuan,
Malaysia, disclosure in relation to accounts can be obtained by the Royal
Malaysia Police or Bank Negara upon application to the High Court in
128. Certain developing countries seriously question why they should willingly assist countries
like Britain and the United States in drug inquiries when the more developed jurisdictions ignore
their for assistance when seeking to protect their economies. See BARRY RIDER, U. S. DEP'T STATE,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION-FAcT OR FICTION, PAPER PRESENTED TO WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA (1988). The then-head of C.I.D. in Malaysia, Datuk Z.
Khan, criticized the attitude of U.S. law enforcement agencies in this context. According to Datuk
Zaman Khan, cooperation was in practice a "one way street" leading to Washington. Datuk Amon
Khan, Head of C.I.D., Address at Second Symposium on Economic and Narcotic Crimes in Taipei
(1993) (on file with author).
129. See generally U.S. Senate, Staff Study: Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks
and Companies: Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations (U.S. Gov't Printer, 1983); I.
WALTER, SECRET MONEY (1985); OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS AND COMPANIES, THE
BUSINESS OF CRIME IN THE EUROMARKETS (1984); Prager & Barry Rider, Money Laundering -
The Risk to Small Salate in MEMORANDA FOR MEETING OF SENIOR LAW OFFICERS OF SMALL
COMMONWEALTH STATES (1983).
130. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 requires persons doing business in
Britain to report to the Secretary of State foreign compulsory orders and allow the Secretary of State
to dictate the response, under threat of a criminal sanction. British Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980 (Eng.). - Under section 181 of the Financial Services Act of 1986, the Department of
Trade and Industry may block the disclosure of information by regulatory authorities in Britain to
an overseas agency even where the request is voluntary. Financial Services Act, 1986, s. 181
(Eng.). See also The Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measure Act, 1984-85, c. 49 (Can.); The
French Law No. 80-538, July 16, 1980.
131. See, e.g., Swiss Civil Code, art. 28 (Switz.); BANKING SECRECY FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND
RELATED RESTRICTIONS (1979).
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regard to the investigation of a specific crime in Malaysia." This is
a major problem in corporate securities regulation, as many matters
would not be susceptible to being characterized as "criminal." For
example, in Malaysia the laundering of the proceeds of insider dealing
is not per se a crime, although it is in Britain and the United States.
Hence, there may well be a problem of double criminality.'33 There
is no doubt that some countries have deliberately created almost
impenetrable secrecy barriers simply to attract business and flight money.
A few have been willing to promote their confidential facilities without
any proper regard as to who might wish to avail themselves of the
advantage of anonymity. In addition to secrecy and blocking statutes, an
ever increasing number of countries have been prepared to permit a
variety of banks and other financial institutions to establish themselves
within their territory primarily to engage in business overseas. These
offshore banks and other institutions, operating behind a wall of secrecy,
often with little prudential or other regulatory oversight over their
activities, provide a marvelous facility for the international fraudster and
money launderer." Sadly, in some jurisdictions, it is not only the
banks and other financial institutions that are prepared to in effect
prostitute themselves, as there would appear to be a ready supply of
lawyers and accountants to also take advantage of this type of business.
Malaysia is not one of these jurisdictions, however. Nevertheless, the
more egregious activities of these Labuan offshore centers have tended
to deprave and corrupt not only those directly involved, but the
environment within which they operate.'35
In practical terms, the insertion of a haven jurisdiction in the
commission of a securities fraud will cause tremendous problems for
investigators. Indeed, in many such cases it will be sufficient to frustrate
any meaningful legal process. Consequently, even where there are
effective procedures for cooperation between the more responsible states,
132. See Barry Rider, Offshore Banking in Labuan, Paper submitted to Royal Malaysian Police
Force at the Symposium on The Misuse and Abuse of Offshore Banks (1992) (copy on file with
author).
133. This was the problem that the U.S. authorities encountered in seek assistance from the
Swiss, under their 1976 Treaty in insider dealing cases. See generally J. Siegel, U.S. Insider
Prohibition in Conflict wzth Swiss Bank Secrecy 4 J. OF COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 353 (1982);
D.A. Szak, International Cooperation in Insider Trading Cases, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1149
(1980)
134. See Where Hot Money Hides, BARRONS, July 11, 1983; P. Willoughby, The Law and
Practice of Tax Havens; Uses and Abuses, Address at the Eighth Commonwealth Law Conference
in Jamaica (1986).
135. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ILLEGAL
USE OF THE BAHAMAS FOR THE TRANS-SHIPMENT OF DANGEROUS DRUGS (1984) (Bah.).
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much will depend upon the degree of involvement of a "haven"
jurisdiction. There are, of course, "havens" or "international financial
centers" that provide bone fide services and are properly run, such as
Labuan, but unfortunately these are the exception rather than the rule.
Where a haven is fraudulently employed, quite often a number of such
jurisdictions will be involved, and it may be possible to obtain
information and even evidence through ingenuity or unilateral action.
U.S. agencies have shown themselves particularly resourceful, but in
practice few countries have the expertise and financial resources for the
sort of operations that North American authorities have undertaken.
Furthermore, there is always the problem of admissibility of evidence
that has been taken illegally, or in circumstances where it is difficult to
adduce "proof" according to the usual rules of evidence. Information
may, however, be extremely valuable in assisting in the location of
evidence that is more assessable or in taking some response that does not
necessarily depend upon the strict legal rules of evidence, such as a
disciplinary action.
B. Memoranda of Understanding
To regularize the procedures for obtaining mutual assistance in legal
proceedings there is an increasing tendency for countries to negotiate
treaties, or at least sign memorandums of understanding (MOUs). Most
countries have at least some bilateral arrangements for extradition, and
Malaysia is no exception in this regard. Yet, in policing the securities
markets, few cases ever reach the stage of an extradition request. As has
already been pointed out, a serious problem on securing international
cooperation in this area is that many so-called "securities offenses" are
not considered "ordinary criminal law offences" or fail on the usual
requirements of double criminality. For example, until comparatively
recently insider dealing was not an extradition crime in English law, and
consequently it would not have been possible for the British Government
to "surrender" a person to the U.S. authorities, even though there are
comprehensive extradition arrangements between Britain and the United
States. This problem manifested itself under the U.S.-Swiss Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters136 and this has also proved to
be a problem between Malaysia and Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, insider
dealing, while considered abusive and subjected to regulatory and
investigatory procedures, is not a criminal offense as it is in Malaysia.
136. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T.
2019, 1052 U.N.T.S. 61.
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Of course, there are many other matters of concern to securities
regulatory authorities that do not involve the criminal law and hence, the
existence or otherwise of extradition arrangements is irrelevant.
Comprehensive Mutual Assistance treaties for cooperation in
criminal matters is now the goal of many countries including Malaysia,
and already some progress has been made. In 1986, Commonwealth
Governments urged by Malaysia endorsed a new scheme for mutual
assistance in criminal matters within the Commonwealth. The so-called
"Harare Scheme"'37 provides an agreed vehicle for Commonwealth
jurisdictions to furnish comprehensive mutual assistance, subject, of
course, to specific enactment within their own domestic law. To some
extent, the Commonwealth Scheme mirrors the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. While both the European
Convention and Harare Scheme are significant steps in the direction of
mutual cooperation, from the standpoint of the securities regulator, they
are of little practical relevance. The European Convention is primarily
directed at criminal proceedings as conceived according to civil law
notions, and thus, would not comport with the procedures under which
most common law countries operate. Indeed, the view of the British
Home Office, until very recently, was that the two systems are wholly
incompatible. It was upon this basis that the British Government refused
the proposal that there should be a mutual assistance treaty between
Britain and Switzerland. Of course, this rather ignores the experience
that the United States and Switzerland have had under their Treaty of
1974.
Securities regulation of particular interest is the Convention on
Insider Trading of the Council of Europe. 38 This Convention provides
for cooperation between signatory states not only in investigating cases
of insider dealing, but also in the monitoring of markets to ensure "equal
access to information for all users of the stock market. ""' Similar
arrangements are required for member countries of the European
Economic Union in the Council Directive for coordination regulations on
insider dealing."4  Article 8 of this instrument provides that the
relevant enforcement agency in each member state is bound to assist the
137. The Commonwealth Scheme for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1986). See also
The Commonwealth Scheme for The Rendition of Fugitive Offenders (1966) (amended 1986); The
Commonwealth Scheme for The Transfer of Convicted Prisoners (1986). See generally T. HUcKLE,
MUTUAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC CRIME (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985).
138. See BARRY RIDER & T.M. ASHE, THE EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING DIRECTIVE (Univ. of
Sienna, 1993).
139. See id.
140. Council Directive 89/07/29, 1989 O.J. 192.
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authorities in other member countries in enforcing the law against insider
abuse.' 4 ' There are, of course, other instruments of the European
Community that also require cooperation between authorities concerned
with policing the financial markets and banking institutions. 4 2  To
date, while enhancement of cooperation has been discussed by law
enforcement and regulatory authorities in other regions, most noticeably
Latin America, the Asia Pacific region, and Caribbean, nothing of
substance has emerged to compare with developments, within
Europe. 143
It is in the area of MOUs that most progress has, however, been
made and is likely to be made in the foreseeable future.'" As already
discussed, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is now well
convinced that the consensual approach to cooperation is to be preferred
and has signed MOUs with over thirty countries and is even about to
enter into one with regulatory authority of the Peoples Republic of
China. Of course, to what extent agreements that have been signed can
be described as "consensual," particularly with some of the smaller
Caribbean countries, has been doubted. "" Nonetheless, it is perfectly
acceptable for the U.S. authorities, given their expertise, resources and
obvious self-interest in promoting effective cooperation in policing the
world's capital markets to take the lead in this regard. Although the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has attempted to
"standardize" the various arrangements that it has already negotiated and
is presently negotiating, in the real world it has not always proved
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Council Directive 82/121/EEC (regarding investment services and information
published by listed issuers).
143. See generally BARRY RIDER & C. NAKAIIMA, INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES IN SECURITIES
REGULATION (Cambridge, 1993).
144. See International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988, Report of the Committee
on Banking, U.S. Senate (1988) U.S. Govt. Printer. MOUs play an important role in other areas
of law enforcement, such as narcotics and in particular the exchange of financial information in
regard to assets derived from illicit trafficking in drugs. See generally E. Nadelmann, Unlaundering
Dirty Money Abroad. U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions, 18 INTERAMERICAN
L. REV. 33 (1986). The Double Taxation Agreements should also be noted, see, e.g., Convention
Between the Government of the U.K. On Behalf of the Government of Bermuda; The Government
of the U.S.A. Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual Assistance in Tax
Matters.
145. The Treaty Between the United Kingdom and the United States Concerning the Cayman
Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, was not universally welcomed in
the Caymans, where it remains a controversial matter, see R. Nash, US and Caymans Sign Crime
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1986. Even in Bermuda, criticism is still made of the Government and
in particular, the former Attorney General for being too cooperative with Washington. Indeed, it
would seem that even the Swiss required a little "inducement" before they agreed to the 1974
Treaty. See BARRY RIDER AND M.L. FFRENCH, TiHE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979).
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feasible to achieve this. Most MOUs that the U.S. Government has
negotiated provide for "cooperation" in the exchange of information not
only for investigatory and traditional law enforcement purposes, but also
for surveillance and monitoring. The Securities and Exchange
Commission is eager to convert as many of these "agreements" into
binding treaties and to add the significant obligation to use, where
possible, available mandatory procedures to obtain information and
evidence in furtherance of the request for assistance.
The Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of 1988146
dramatically expands the powers of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission to respond to a request for assistance from a "foreign
securities authority." The Commission "in its discretion" may use its
mandatory procedures for obtaining information for a foreign authority,
provided that the authority confirms that the matter under inquiry relates
to a violation of its securities regulations, whether or not the same
conduct would amount to a violation of U.S. laws had it occurred within
jurisdiction. 47 There must also be an undertaking of reciprocity.' 48
This provision gives the Commission a very wide and practical means of
assisting foreign agencies, and it has been indicated that even though
there is no question of its use being conditional on an existing MOUs,
the Commission will be far more inclined to exercise its discretion in
circumstances where there is such an arrangement.
1. Britain.-Given the significance of reciprocity, a number of
other jurisdictions have been "encouraged" to amend their laws to
facilitate the execution of requests for colleagues overseas. Under the
English Common law, it is more or less certain that statutory powers of
investigation, such as those for obtaining and executing a search warrant,
may only be used for matters for which there is proper jurisdiction, and
even then the results of such an inquiry cannot normally be handed over
to a foreign authority. This is also the legal position in Malaysia.
The British Companies Act of 1989 does seek to bring the British
law in line with that in the United States, so far as securities regulation
is concerned. 49 If necessary, it empowers the British Department of
Trade and Industry to conduct an inquiry using mandatory procedures to
compel production of documents and witnesses, at the request of an
"overseas regulatory authority" that exercises a function corresponding
146. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-80 (1988).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. British Companies Act, 1989 (Eng.).
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to the Department of Trade and Industry Securities or Securities and
Investment Board under the Financial Services Act of 1986 or the
enforcement of rules relating to insider dealing." In considering
whether to exercise its wide investigatory powers, the Department may
take account of reciprocity and whether the relevant breach of rule has
a close parallel under British law. It is important to note, however, that
unlike the U.S. statute, cooperation is not ruled out by a lack of
reciprocity. The British government has used these powers on behalf of
a number of foreign governments, including Malaysia.
Other provisions in the Companies Act significantly strengthen the
role of MOUs in policing the securities markets. Where satisfactory
arrangements have been negotiated with another regulatory authority,
whether domestic or foreign, it will be open to the Securities and
Investment Board or one of the other self-regulatory authorities to rely
on the information that other foreign authorities provide in the discharge
of its regulatory and enforcement functions. While there is a widespread
feeling in the various regulatory authorities that information can be as
easily obtained through informal contacts other than MOUs, it is only
information that is communicated pursuant to a "satisfactory
arrangement" that may be directly relied upon in this manner.
At present the British Government, through the Department of
Trade and Industry, has six signed MOUs. There are a number of other
special agreements for financial information, but these are not primarily
directed at enforcement. The Securities and Investment Board has itself
negotiated a number of MOUs with a great variety of overseas authorities
primarily concerned with the exchange of information for authorization
purposes and its capital adequacy rules. The Securities and Futures
Association has also placed on a formal basis many of the informal
arrangements that it operated before the Financial Services Act of 1986
in regard to the Stock Exchange. Perhaps one of the most significant is
the MOU that it has signed with the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) on exchange of enforcement
information. The various self-regulatory authorities in Britain have also
ensured that their own rules permit a substantial degree of interface into
these various arrangements.
2. Malaysia. -Malaysia has also recognized the importance of
developing a network of formal and informal agreements designed to
promote the exchange of information and international cooperation. To
150. See supra notes 74-76.
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date, the Securities Commission has signed three MOUs. The first was
with the Indonesian authorities on January 12, 1994, the second with the
Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong on February 22, 1994
and the third, with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand
on April 4, 1994. Other arrangements are being negotiated with a
number of other countries. Of course, the Malaysian Central Bank also
has a number of similar arrangements in relation to its role as supervisor
of financial institutions. The law does not, however, currently permit
Malaysian authorities, such as the Securities Commission or the Registrar
of Companies, to use their statutory powers of investigation on behalf of
a foreign agency inquiring into matters that do not involve an infraction
of the laws of Malaysia. This is considered to be a serious handicap and
has meant that it has had to send its own officers to Malaysia to carry
out inquiries itself as essentially private investigators. Obviously this is
not satisfactory.
C. Disclosure in Conjunction with Investigatory Powers
1. Britain. -Reference has already been made to the almost
"inquisitional" powers entrusted to the British Director of the SFO,
under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1987.' While the
British Securities and Fraud Office is concerned with only "serious
frauds," it is possible that those charged with policing the financial
markets will come within this statutory mandate. Of course, the Director
has so far shown no willingness to regard crimes such as "insider
dealing" as serious frauds, and a number of matters that have already
been referred to the SFO have been rejected on the basis that the facts
do not indicate a serious fraud protectable in England. 52
In determining whether it is appropriate for the SFO to pursue a
matter that has been referred to it, inquiries may well have to be initiated
and consequently the Office might well come into possession of
information that cannot be handled by it, yet is highly relevant to the
responsibilities of some other authority. Section 3 of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1987 empowers the SFO to disclose information that is
obtained pursuant to its statutory powers to various prosecutorial and
regulatory authorities, including "anybody having supervisory, regulatory
or disciplinary functions in relation to any profession or any area of
commercial activity. "153 Therefore, it is in order for the Office to
151. Criminal Justice Act, 1987, s.2 (Eng.).
152. See supra notes 80-81.
153. Criminal Justice Act, 1987, s.3 (Eng.).
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disclose relevant information to the various authorities operating under
the Financial Services Act of 1986, and in practice this is regularly done.
This provision further states that the Office may disclose such
information to "any person or body having, under the law of any country
or territory outside the United Kingdom" corresponding powers and
responsibilities."t Thus, in appropriate cases the Office could disclose
information that it has already obtained pursuant to its statutory powers
to a securities regulatory authority in another jurisdiction.
The Director is also authorized to enter into "agreements" to
"supply information" or to "receive information" from other relevant
authorities, and these can be of a general or restrictive nature. So far the
Director has only sought to utilize this particular power to agree with
foreign authorities that information disclosed by his office, or received
by him, will be used for specific purposes. Obviously, occasions arise
where other agencies are prepared to disclose information to the Office,
but are concerned that it shall only be used for specific purposes. By the
same token, the Director may himself wish to impose such restrictions
on further disclosure or use. This can be achieved through the expedient
of an "agreement" under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act of
1987.155 It should be noted, however, that under the Director's general
power to disclose information to other agencies, or under his power to
negotiate "agreements" for such cooperation, he is not empowered to
actually utilize his investigatory powers in response to a request for
assistance from either a domestic or foreign authority. Rather, he is only
authorized to pass information that he has already obtained. Of course,
the dividing line is not a clear one, and it way well be necessary for the
Director to use his powers to obtain information upon which he can
properly resolve whether a serious fraud has been committed within his
jurisdiction.
While it is probable that most systems of law do not actually impose
the constraints on sharing information that they are often thought to
do,"' it is understandable that those who might well have to face civil
and other actions for alleged improper disclosure, act with a degree of
circumspection. Section 179 of the Financial Services Act of 1986
provides that it is a criminal offense for certain "primary recipients" of
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally S. Froomkin, supra note 72. See also Gartside v. Outram, 26 L.J. 113
(1856). "The true doctrine is that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity. You
cannot make me the confident of a crime of a Fraud . .. ."
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"restricted information" to disclose it, without the authority of the person
to whom it relates, or for a person who receives such information from
a "primary recipient" to do so.157 Restricted information is defined to
include information that is obtained by a primary recipient in the
discharge of, or for the discharge of its functions under the Act, or rules
and regulations made thereunder. The category of "primary recipient"
is limited to those agencies which have legal responsibilities and powers
to obtain information under the Act. Thus, the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Securities and Investments Board are included, but the
other self-regulatory authorities are not. The position in regard to
information that they might obtain under their own rules is governed by
those rules and the general law. Of course, if a self-regulatory authority
receives "restricted information" from the Securities and Investment
Board, it will be subject to the restrictions in section 179.
Section 180 of the Financial Services Act contains a number of
exceptions to the general prohibition contained within Section 179.158
These exceptions include the disclosure of information for a criminal,
civil or disciplinary proceeding, or for the proper performance of some
regulatory or legal function, or where the identity of the person
concerned remains confidential. Section 180(3) further provides that
section 179 will not restrict the disclosure of information "for the
purpose of enabling or assisting any public or other authority for the time
being designated for the purposes of section 180" by the Department of
Trade and Industry.159 While the Department has been willing to
consider "designating" a wide class of agencies and authorities under this
provision, it has indicated caution in dealing with international
organizations such as the General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol under
section 180(6) and has made clear that the restrictions in section 179 do
not preclude the disclosure of "restricted information" to an authority
outside the United Kingdom that perform functions corresponding to
those of the Department of Trade and Industry under the Financial
Services Act of 1986 or under the anti-insider dealing law. Of course,
under section 181 the Department may direct that information shall not
be disclosed to any person or authority outside the United Kingdom
where the Secretary of State considers such to be against the public
interest. 'o
157. Financial Services Act, 1986, s. 179 (Eng.).
158. Id. s. 180.
159. Id.
160. See CCH GUIDE, supra note 20.
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2. Malaysia.-There is no such similar provisions under Malaysian
law in regard to the Securities Commission. It is to be regretted that the
Malaysian authorities do not have this facility in regard to evidence
obtained under their investigatory provisions. Information received by
regulatory authorities in the exercise of their functions will generally be
restricted in the sense that it should not be disclosed other than for the
purpose for which it was obtained, or another is legally justifiable, such
as the prosecution of crime. Section 43 of the Securities Commission
Act of 1992 is a good example of such a provision. 1 ' In many cases,
there will be specific legal obligations on the recipients of such
information preventing free or even controlled disclosure of this
information, and even in the case of those authorities not operating under
direct statutory power, the general law and their own rules may well
produce a similar result.
D. Unlawful Actions
So far we have discussed "unilateral" assertion of jurisdiction
extraterritorially and the various procedures have been developed for
bilateral cooperation and mutual assistance within the legal system. Of
course, both forms of action may not necessarily conform to acceptable
legal or for that matter social standards. There have been cases where
states have resorted to illegal actions in the territory of another to assert
jurisdiction over an individual or obtain evidence. While the desperation
felt by some agencies when faced with the various problems that have
been alluded to in this article, can be readily understood, unlawful
actions of this sort invariably cause profound problems and distrust
which undermines future cooperation. By the same token, states have on
occasion been prepared to cooperate, if not unlawfully, certainly on
dubious grounds, to insure the return of a wanted fugitive under
extradition arrangements. Countries have been prepared to achieve the
same results through resort to deportation. Of course, how far it is
acceptable for a state to go in assisting another will inevitably depend
upon a host of factors, the political considerations usually being more
significant than the legal.
VIII. Multilateral Initiatives
It should be clear from the discussion so far that there are inevitable
limitations to the effectiveness of international cooperation through
bilateral devices. Consequently, thought has been given to various
161. Securities Commission Act, 1992, s. 43 (Malay.).
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multinational initiatives. Comparatively early in the life of the European
Community, suggestions were made for a Euro-Securities and Exchange
Commission, 62 and although this is still many years off, vastly
increased cooperation will lead to a de facto integration in many areas.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
provides a forum for specialized discussion of international fiscal matters
and has shown some interest in securities regulation. However, it has
never been seriously suggested that the OECD should perform a
regulatory or policing function, or for that matter even coordinate such.
The same is true, at even a lower level, of organization such as the
International Federation of Stock Exchanges (Federation Internationals
des Bourses de Valeurs).
Considerable ignorance exists as to the constitution and capabilities
of the International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO-Interpol). It is
often assumed, quite erroneously, that ICPO-Interpol provides a facility
for investigating international securities frauds and pursuing the offenders
around the world. In fact, the ICPO-Interpol network is primarily
directed to facilitation communication between ordinary police forces,
which are its exclusive members. Securities regulatory authorities are
not members of this network and in most jurisdictions are not permitted
access to it. This is the position in both Britain and Malaysia for
example. Furthermore, article 3 of the Constitution of ICPO-Interpol
confines the organization's mandate to "ordinary criminal law
offences."163 Many of the matters that are of concern to those charged
with regulating the securities markets would not fall within this
definition. Finally, the General Secretariat, in Lyon, is very small and
is not specialized. Its members are ordinary police officers seconded for
a limited period from national police forces. Of course, this is not to say
that on occasion the ICPO-Interpol network cannot be used to
communicate police information concerning securities fraudsters both
effectively and with security. It is clear, however, that the role of ICPO-
Interpol in policing the securities markets is minimal and is most unlikely
to increase. To some extent, this reflects the fact that in many countries
the investigation of matters such as insider dealing and stock market
fraud has been substantially taken out of the hands of the ordinary police
and given to specialized agencies such as the Malaysian Securities
Commission, Registry of Companies, and Bank Negara.
162. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKET 235 (1966). See generally, RIDER & FFRENCH, supra at 145,
at 275.
163. ICPO-INTERPOL CONST., art. 3.
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Commonwealth governments, recognizing the limits of "police force
to police force" cooperation launched an initiative in 1977. This led to
the establishment of a special office within the Commonwealth
Secretariat in 1980. Unlike the General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol, the
Commonwealth Secretariat, which is based in London, is an
intergovernmental organization with full diplomatic privileges. This
office, did, in international law enforcement terms, enjoy a unique
mandate until it was undermined and emasculated. Its officers were
mandated to conduct investigations and to develop and deploy
intelligence, on a proactive and preventive basis, in regard to economic
crimes and related matters. This office, which was known as the
Commonwealth Commercial Crime Unit consists not only police officers,
but lawyers, accountants, intelligence specialists, and individuals with
regulatory experience, drawn from all over the Commonwealth. During
its "operational years," it had officers attached to it from not only the
Royal Malaysian Police Force, but also the Malaysian Anti-Corporation
Agency and Registry of Companies. Its staff were permitted to travel
widely and actually take up cases and investigate them to conclusion. Of
course, it is important to recognize that this initiative was not primarily
concerned with securing criminal convictions but combatting economic
crime and abuse at all levels. Therefore, action was not taken simply
within the traditional criminal justice system, but through immigration,
licensing, and other such procedures. The Commonwealth initiative was
not confined to Commonwealth countries and close-working relationships
were developed with the agencies in a number of non-Commonwealth
countries. For example, in regard to securities regulation, officers of the
Unit worked on a number of occasions with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, and most successfully with various U.S. state
securities administrators. Unlike the police network, the Commonwealth
initiative made a point of bringing into its network any agency that has
had a relevant jurisdiction or interest, even though it might not be
considered to be conventional law enforcement authority with powers of
arrest. In combatting serious international fraudsters, the Unit often
resorted to the use of civil procedures to force disclosure and then take
action against assets derived from the illicit activity in question. Indeed,
the expertise that the Unit developed in identifying and tracing property
derived from criminal activity led to the widening of its mandate in 1983
to organized criminal activity, at the suggestion of the Malaysian and
Singapore Attorneys General.
From 1981 to 1989, the Unit responded to over 3400 requests for
assistance and handled in excess of 2000 cases. About thirty-five percent
of these involved securities-related offenses, and an additional twenty
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percent would have been relevant to authorities charged with policing the
financial markets. Commonwealth governments requested the Unit to
develop a data base of individuals and organizations that have violated
securities and other relevant regulations in association with other
international and regional organizations. It was intended that this
database would be accessible to agencies inside and outside the
Commonwealth. Obviously, such a service would greatly facilitate
vetting procedures and would enable regulatory authorities to far better
monitor the activities of criminals in this area. A number of national
governments pledged their support to this particular initiative, and it was
hoped that it would be interfaced with similar data bases in the United
States and other key non-Commonwealth countries. It was also hoped
that Commonwealth Governments might devise a scheme, similar to the
Harare Scheme, to promote and facilitate cooperation between securities
and financial markets regulators."
Since 1990, however, the Commonwealth Unit has been rendered
in practical terms "unoperational" and is now only a shallow reflection
of what it was and what governments intended it should be. The reasons
why this potentially significant initiative in international cooperation was
undermined are many and unedifying. Given the exalted position of
many of the Unit's targets and the political influence that they were able
to wield, it is perhaps surprising that the Unit was able to function as it
did between 1981 and 1989. There is little doubt that the
Commonwealth Secretary General, at that time, became increasingly
embarrassed by the stance of the Unit and it has been said that things
were brought to a head when the Unit became involved in revealing the
truth about the criminal operations of the Bank of Commerce and Credit
International (BCCI)! It was later revealed that Sir Shridith Ramphal had
during the period taken a substantial loan from the BCCI and was
negotiating a UKstg 300,000 a year consultancy contract with the
BCCI. Today, the Unit is only concerned with facilitating the exchange
of legal information and is in practical terms irrelevant to the matters
discussed in this article.
The International Organisation of Securities Commission and Similar
Organisations (IOSCO) has aspirations to become an ICPO-Interpol of
securities regulators. While this rather loose association has discussed
international cooperation in policing the markets on a number of
occasions, in practice little development has taken place. The
Constitution of IOSCO does provide for mutual assistance between its
164. See supra note 137.
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members, and there is no doubt that the facility that its regular meetings
provide for regulators to meet with each other and discuss common
problems is highly beneficial. Consideration has been given within
IOSCO to setting up a limited data base, but given the absence of a
viable Secretariat or the necessary resources, little headway has been
made. There are of course, other associations such as the Japan
Securities Dealers Association, which have attempted to project
themselves internationally.
Mention has already been made of various regional initiatives to
facilitate cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Indeed, even
the General Secretariat of ICPO-Interpol has been forced to recognize
that such matters are particularly well-suited to be discussed and dealt
with at a regional or interest group level. This approach has been
encouraged by essentially regionally-promoted initiatives, often with
backing from the U.S. Government and bodies such as the OECD.
Regional Financial Action Task Forces have been constituted within the
overall framework of the program ordained by the G7 countries, with
U.N. support.
Some of the Caribbean states have also explored establishing a
Carricom group, but outside the area of harmonization of company law,
little has been achieved given the embryonic stage of the many of the
capital markets in the region. Discussion have also taken place in Africa
and the Middle East along the same lines as in the Caribbean, but to
even less effect. Since 1965, various proposals have been circulating
within the Asia Pacific Region for the establishment of a contact group
between regulators. After abortive initiatives by the Philippine Securities
and Exchange Commission in the mid-1970s and then the Taiwanese
Securities Commission in the mid-1980s, there would appear to be every
chance of success for the contact group launched by Dato Dr. Mohd
Munir Majid at the First Symposium of ASEAN Capital Markets
Regulators in Kuala Lumpur on April 5, 1994.16 Of course, this
particular initiative is in its infancy and it remains to be seen how
effective it will be in fostering corporation within ASEAN. Experience
165. Dato' Dr. Mohd Munir, Address at First Symposium of ASEAN Capital Market Regulators
in Kuala Lumpur (Apr. 5, 1994) (on file with author). Dr Munir emphasized that the group will
be function based and driven and will be concerned to promote cooperation in five potential areas,
namely (1) improving stock cleaning and settlement system; (2) harmonizing capital adequacy
requirements for stockbrokers; (3) regulation of financial derivatives; (4) cooperation on
enforcement; and (5) administering disclosure rules. Of course, it has to be remembered that this
is not a regional initiative as such, and it remains to be seen how effective it can be with major
players such as Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand and increasingly
China left on the sidelines. Nonetheless the Malaysian initiative is to be welcomed.
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would indicate that unless it has a small secretariat and a budget of its
own it will be less likely to make a significant impact.
While it is beneficial for international cooperation to be promoted,
there is a danger of fragmentation and rivalry. Essentially, the only
national Organization that has achieved any real credibility in this regard,
is the North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA). " The British Government, through the Department of
Trade and Industry has organized several informal meetings 67 of
selected regulatory authorities, and these have no doubt promoted
understanding and mutual respect.
At this point in time, however, it is difficult to predict how
successful these various international initiatives will be. What is perhaps
more significant, is the increasing interest in proper policing of the
international financial markets taken by the central banks. The American
Bar Association"es has suggested that the Bank for International
Settlements should assume a far greater role in coordinating enforcement
in this area. Several influential Central Bankers have lent their weight
to this proposal, but there is no real sign of this being taken up yet, other
than in the context of anti-money laundering initiatives.
IX. Conclusion
In an article such as this, it is impossible to come to any general
conclusion of substance. The subject is too disparate and the problems
too intractable and complex. There are certainly no panaceas and no
easy answers. Economic crime and abuse is never going to be eradicated
from the financial markets, and this is so whatever political philosophy
one might choose to espouse. Indeed, arguably the degree of regulation
and control that would be required to attains this, even if it was
acceptable and practical, would be such as to destroy the proper
functioning of the markets."
What is clear, is that each market, no matter how similar to others,
is nonetheless unique. Markets and securities industries are complex
166. NASAA's membership includes several Canadian Provincial securities authorities as well
as Mexico.
167. These are known as the "Wilton Park" meetings.
168. Letter from the American Bar Association to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(Aug. 30, 1985).
169. Regulatory overkill is just as real a threat to the financial services industry as regulatory
ambivalence. As Professor Gower repeatedly emphasized in his reports on investor protection in
Britain. It is not certain that we have achieved the correct balance in Britain, and it would be
presumptuous to express uninvited a view as to whether other jurisdictions such as Malaysia have
done so.
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structures depending on a host of political, economic and social factors.
Consequently, there is a very real limit as to how far the experience of
other jurisdictions is relevant in fashioning the most appropriate laws and
controls for one's own markets. There is no doubt that such countries
have simply "borrowed" the laws and regulations of others without any
regard to the different climate and environment in which such took form
and matured. Until recently, this was a criticism that could justifiably
be made of securities regulation in Malaysia.
What is absolutely necessary, is a realization at all levels, that
preventing fraud and abuse in the markets is an important factor in
promoting confidence in the integrity and efficiency of such. It is not
something that can be left to one man and his dog, any more than the
protection of any other valuable national asset. Crooks will gravitate to
the financial markets because at the end of the day, that is where the
money is! The experience of Malaysia in relation to bank-related fraud
and abuse is clear evidence of this. Furthermore, given the nature of the
markets, without very developed system of international cooperation, no
matter how effective national initiatives, they are almost bound to
fail. 170
One of the greatest obstacles to effective international policing is the
utter nonsense that is sometimes passed off as state of the art law
enforcement. If those responsible for protecting the markets were bold
enough to come out and state how bad the situation is, then and perhaps
only then will the political will manifest itself in the resources necessary
to make any significant impact on the international fraudsters that
regularly rape and pillage our national assets with impunity. For, at the
end of the day, we all share the same aspiration-"we want a market
which possesses credibility, has a good image and has the confidence of
investors. "171
170. As Dato' Dr. Munir, the Chairman of the Malaysian Securities Commission, has
acknowledged and emphasized on a number of occasions, international cooperation must be
promoted as the primary weapon in the arsenal, although never forgetting that any international
initiative will at the end of the day only achieve such effectiveness as the national authority is
capable of achieving.
171. Y.B. Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim, Minister of Finance, Second Budget Speech (1993).

